FAA probes Colgan on pilot overscheduling
WASHINGTON-The Federal Aviation Administration is investigating whether
Colgan Air - which operated the Continental Connection commuter plane that
crashed in Clarence Center on Feb. 12 - violated federal rules by
overscheduling its pilots.
Meanwhile, sources said the National Transportation Safety Board's
investigation of the crash is increasingly focusing on Colgan's
pilot-training program, particularly pertaining to how the plane's
stall-protection system operates in icing conditions.
Revelations about the FAA and safety board investigations come a week before
the board begins a three-day hearing into the Clarence Center crash.
The board previously listed "fatigue management" and "stall recovery
training" as factors that it was studying as it searched for a probable
cause for the crash of Continental Connection Flight 3407, which claimed 50
lives, including one on the ground.
At this point, however, it is unclear whether the FAA investigation is
connected in any way to the Clarence Center crash.
"A small number" of Colgan pilots and the airline itself have received
letters of investigation from the FAA, the Colgan pilots union said in an
April 20 memo to its members that never mentions the Buffalo-area crash.
Agency officials have audited Colgan pilot schedules dating from last
November, and "through this process they have identified a small group of
pilots who, they believe, have violated flight-time or duty-time
regulations," said the memo, which was obtained by The Buffalo News.
Current FAA regulations say pilots can fly for no more than eight out of
every 24 hours, provided the pilot has had at least eight continuous hours
of rest during that 24-hour period. And if that rest period is less than
nine hours, the pilot's next rest period must be lengthened to compensate.
Airlines that violate those regulations can be subjected to civil fines. For
example, American Airlines was fined $285,000 in the wake of such violations
in 2001. Pilots, meanwhile, can be suspended for breaking those rules.
The Colgan pilots memo offers no indication of how that airline or its
pilots might have violated those regulations, and it urges pilots who have
received the letter to contact their union representative.
Laura Brown, an FAA spokeswoman, said she could not comment on or confirm
any such investigation.
Joe Williams, a spokesman for Pin-
nacle Airlines, which owns Colgan, said: "Colgan and our pilots operate in
full accordance with federal aviation regulations. There have been no, nor
do we expect any, enforcement actions against any of our pilots. Any
additional questions should be addressed to the FAA."
Meanwhile, the National Transportation Safety Board investigation of the
Clarence Center crash is raising questions about an unusual feature of the
Bombardier Dash 8 Q400 aircraft's stall-protection system - and whether the
crew of the doomed plane was properly trained to know how that system worked
in icing conditions.
At issue is the plane's "REF speeds" switch, a toggle in the cockpit that
aims to account for the fact that planes stall at a higher rate of speed
when they have ice on their wings.
When the REF, or reference speed, switch is set on "INCR," the stall-warning
system will activate at a speed that's about 20 knots higher than it would
when it is in the off position.
Sources said the switch was in the "INCR" or increase position on Flight
3407, as it should have been-although the crew might not have known that
this would activate the stall-warning system much more quickly than normal.
"Unless you were trained in this maneuver, it would take you aback," said
Donald
L. McCune Jr., a pilot and attorney with Motley Rice LLC who represents the
National Air Disaster Alliance in its lawsuit against the federal government
over supposed lack of action on airplane icing. "It would happen so much
more quickly than you were used to."
Most planes don't include an REF switch and instead automatically adjust the
stall-warning speed based on the presence of ice on the wing, rather than
ratcheting it up by an arbitrary 20 knots, McCune said.
Asked for a description of the operations of the REF speed switch, a
spokesman for the plane's manufacturer, Bombardier Aerospace of Toronto,
declined to comment.
"It's possible this issue will come up at next week's public hearings; with
that, we believe it's wrong to enter into a dialogue that has the potential
to feed speculation on the cause of the tragedy," said the Bombardier
spokesman, John R. Arnone.
The safety board investigation of the crash has increasingly focused on
possible pilot error, and either fatigue or inadequate training could prove
to be a reason behind any such mistake.
In its last news release on the Clarence Center crash, the safety board said
the plane's stall-warning device - called the "stick shaker" - activated as
the plane was approaching the Buffalo area and traveling at a speed of 130
knots, "which is consistent with the de-icing system being engaged."
After the stick shaker activated, the pilot pulled back on the plane's yoke,
causing the twin-engine turboprop plane to suddenly jerk upward before
spinning out of control.
Several aviation experts previously told The News that this appears to be a
fatal error on the part of the crew. The proper response to a stall is to
lower the plane's nose to recover airspeed, increase the power and level the
wings, rather than to pull the plane's nose upward.
The plane's pilot, Capt. Marvin D. Renslow, and co-pilot, Rebecca Lynn Shaw,
died in the crash.
Renslow, 47, had just started flying the Q400 the previous December and had
accumulated 109 flight hours on the plane. Shaw, 24, had flown 772 hours in
the aircraft.
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