PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - "To err is human": differing attitudes to mistakes in EK and Turkish accidents
Old 4th May 2009, 23:57
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PJ2
 
Join Date: Mar 2003
Location: BC
Age: 76
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Gibon2;

For an SLF contribution to this discussion, you get an 'A'. Nice work.

Typing is useful to begin with, but very quickly the process becomes a human one and is therefore subject to enormous subtleties which defy categorzation. But I suspect you already know and appreciate that.

4Greens;

Along with Jim's book there are others equally if not more important in terms of human error, which I highly recommend anyone wishing to comprehend why this accident is so horrifying to professional aircrews and so misunderstood by non-pilots including engineers. Hopefully this thread will run it's course soon.

Nothing excuses what this crew did not do - fly the airplane. All the rest are unimportant details raised by those who won't/can't admit this fundamental fact.

Further, there is no understanding in this accident that is useful in the addressing of organizational, systemic or human factors accidents.

For an understanding of those kinds of accidents, (which aren't really accidents at all but happenings-with-precursors), the following references will be of interest:

Some titles are:

Normal Accidents: Living with High Risk Technologies,
Charles Perrow

The Field Guide to Understanding Human Factors
and
Just Culture,
- both by Sidney Dekker

Why-Because Analysis, (web-based)
Ladkin

Accident Precursor Analysis and Management: Reducing Technological Risk Through Diligence,
National Academy of Engineering

The Challenger Launch Decision:Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA,
Diane Vaughan

Organization at the Limit: Lessons From the Columbia Disaster
Starbuck & Farjoun

Beyond Aviation Human Factors,
James Reason




The Real Slim Shady;
"what's it doing now" is becoming more common.
And, perhaps in increasing frequency given the accidents we have seen thus far this year, "I think I'll just let it do what it wants...".

The training issues alone are substantial but checking issues as well as flight data programs are crucial. Without those tools, an airline is flying blind and every incident or accident will be a shock and a surprise.

Last edited by PJ2; 5th May 2009 at 01:05.
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