To address a few questions put forth.
1-TOGA thrust WAS applied after the 2nd Rotate call after no rotation was apparent at the incorrect Vr speed. Therefore they made the correct response but unfortunately by this time the tail was scaping the runway.
2-Flex takeoff thrust does not supply less power than climb thrust (part of the computer program), unlike on some older aircraft types. Therefore, retarding the thrust levers to climb thrust at acceleration height, will not result in more thrust from the engines. I am basing that on past performance training, since these particulars were not taught at EK. Performance training on the Airbus, is less than ideal at EK and I don't think anyone would disagree with that fact.
3-One fellow was discussing how there can be some instances when it is still possible to get airborne on the remaining runway with a failed engine BEFORE V1. Sometimes this might be the case, but there are too many factors to even consider this option. VMCG is one of those factors. Engine failure before V1= rejected takeoff.
On the other hands, sometimes there is obviously enough runway available to STOP an aircraft AFTER V1 with an engine failure, but it is not an option. In fact, the experts have determined that a pilot should be GO MINDED after 100kts and up until V1, which of course means AFTER V1 a pilot should never consider trying to stop on the remaining runway, unless it is obvious the aircraft will not get airborne (something catastrophic in other words)
The manufacturers takes the view that it is better to get airborne after a problem occurs at high speed on the runway (below V1) except in a few instances. Airbus gives 5 examples when a pilot should consider rejecting a takeoff above 100kts and below V1.
Since these guys rotated at what they thought was the correct speed, and given the inherent time delay, they had but one option and that was to apply TOGA thrust and continue the takeoff. Perhaps it was possible to stop in the remaining distance, who knows, but it was not an option.
So they made one mistake, entering a number into either the laptop, MCDU or both computers. The question remains why?
4-Another fellow mentioned that being qualified on 3 types of airbus, each with vastly different performance, weights, (number of engines too) might be a factor. I agree. It was a causal factor and one that should be addressed. It is not uncommon to lose currency on either the A340/A332, which means more than 90 days without a takeoff and landing in one of the types. (A343 and A345 are considered one and the same, in spite of the fact they have much different characteristics on takeoff and landing)
The aviation gods at EK will say there is no issue flying the different types but isn't it interesting that both major and near catastrophic accidents at EK in the past 5 years occured as a direct/indirect result of CCQ on the Airbus. The Johannesburg accident was a direct result of cross-training and the MEL accident was likely in part caused by this policy as well. The Joburg guys had never even flown an A343 prior to their takeoff from a high elevation airport, in an underpowered (relatively speaking) aircraft, and with improper training. This fact, rather explicity demonstrates EK's attitude wrt to cross-training.
In any event, it is more likely for pilots to remain oblivious to an input error in the computers, if they are not as familiar on type. I hope this factor is addressed by the authorities.