Cazatou:
<<para 32c
"in the forecast conditions, the icing clearance would have allowed an IMC pull-up from low level flight to Safety Altitude over the Mull of Kintyre.">>
An important point that should have been noted by anyone in discussing the options and should have stopped the repeated waffle about the a/c not being able to climb to safe altitude.
<<para 56
" The positioning of the Rad Alt bugs would have limited the crew to either a visual or a visual and audio warning at 69ft, depending on selection of the audio selector switch would could not be determined. This warning would have been too late, in the circumstances, to prevent impact with the ground." >>
And was it not you, yourself who first pointed out the most obvious meaning of such settings as found, that the RADALT alarm being set on 69ft (the minimum?) was consistent with an imminent landing in marginal conditions?
<<para 51
" any visual contact with the Mull or Lighthouse in the prevailing weather conditions should have prompted a reduction in height and speed well below those at impact.">>
At what perceived distance? - they surely had sight of the (fuzzy) Mull for many miles; the question is, what was the stopping distance for a Chinook at cruising speed? If you are, say, intending a high speed approach to an LZ, at what perceived distance from it do you have to start pulling up in one of those (very agile) beasts? Would being mistaken by ½ a mile or so stuff you up?
Which of the following seems more likely for this experienced crew:
a. they discarded their nav computer (by changing waypoint) when apparently unaware of how close they were to a hazard which they had no need to be anywhere near;
b. they misjudged the closing range when approaching an LZ in difficult conditions.