QF 1.
I would add to Mr Wooby's "contributing factors", a non appreciation of the very wet runway and the desirability of using 30 Flap and Full Reverse Thrust. When the F/O had commenced the "Go around" it certainly should have been continued with. The previous experience of the Captain in a Training and Simulator environment certainly did not help in this case as he took control without advising the F/O, closed three thrust levers to flight idle leaving No 1 forward where it reached 1.50 EPR before being retarded. Idle reverse was never selected, let alone full reverse. The "logic" systems were confused and the auto-brake tripped to OFF, directional control was initially difficult and centreline was regained just before the aircraft left the end of the runway. This was a classic case of a poor landing approach contributing to a long and hot touch-down. It was further compounded by a breakdown in communication between the pilots and a company policy of using 25 Flap and Idle Reverse as the preferred configuration. In the report which I read the pilots between them had seen only about six Full Flap/Max Reverse landings. One, as I recall, had never witnessed it at all other than in the Sim. As in most accidents a combination of factors lead to the outcome. Lessons were learned and actions taken to address the identified deficiencies. It could easily have been a much harder lesson.