This is what a DAC Test pilot says about the MD-11
What happened here (in Narita) is the same as what happened in Hong Kong (to a China Airlines MD-11) and Newark NJ (to another FedEx MD-11) some years ago. The hard landings, which resulted in ALL cases from failure of the aircraft to respond appropriately to pilot control inputs, resulted in rupture of the wing spar by the main gear oleo strut, breaking the wing; the lift from the wing not yet broken then caused the aircraft to roll, and turn upside down. In the case this morning, both wings broke - first the left, and then as the roll angle reached about 80° LWD, the right wing also broke. this can be seen clearly on the video presented on the BBC News website.
The failure of the aircraft to respond appropriately to pilot control inputs is the result of certification of the aircraft despite the omission of a vital part of the aircraft flight control system: namely the rate command function of the LSAS system. This omission leads, under certain circumstances, to what can be described as a "cliff-like" APC* as a result of the extremely slow response of the airplane to elevator control inputs at high gross landing weights. Despite protestations by the Douglas Aircraft Co. that the aircraft flies "just like a DC-10" (which are blatant untruths) the airplane is inherently dangerous and extremely difficult to handle in gusty wind conditions, especially at high landing weights.
I have had many discussions with FedEx ( and Delta) pilots and instructors about the MD-11, and have invariably heard horror stories about landings. I feel a great sense of sadness for the families of the airmen who were victims of this tragedy, and I know that sadness will turn into anger when once again the NTSB/Boeing clique start to insist that this was all caused by pilot error.
I am once again reminded of a statement by the chief investigator of the Hong Kong MD-11 accident, Mr. Robert Benzon, who, in the presence of several Boeing engineers, the Asst. VP of flight safety at China Airlines, and myself, said: "...sometimes we have to burn a couple of pilots to protect the local industry..." Not this time, Mr. B.
"cliff-like" APC
Airplane-Pilot-Coupling - the phenomenon used to be called PIO, but the name was changed so to avoid the implication of pilot causality.
A more complete description of this aircraft design/response problem can be found in Aviation Safety and Pilot Control published by the National Research Council. ISBN-10: 0309056888