If I may, I’d like to add to my previous two posts regarding Configuration Control. But first, to recap, if an aircraft or equipment is not under CC, then the Safety Case or Safety argument cannot be validated or verified, a pre-requisite for an aircraft to be deemed “airworthy” or fit for purpose. But, as we have seen, it can be offered to the Release to Service Authority knowing that it is unsafe, and subsequently Released to Service. Furthermore, the contract can be paid off in full, in the knowledge that the contractual requirement to make the aircraft safe has not been met. Similarly, this contractual requirement may be waived, with full payment made. This has been ruled on many times, and is still the case; although MoD is somewhat reluctant to advise Boards of Inquiry or Coroners’ Inquests of this little gem. I wonder why.
As I noted, in July 1999 CDP acknowledged CC of the Chinook Mk2 was somewhat lacking (in 1999).
In the few years leading up to the accident, the MoD slashed funding to maintain the Build Standard (what the PAC refer to as “design status”, a crucial component of which is CC), so the Mk1 suffered along with most aircraft and their equipment. You don’t have to take my word for this; it’s noted in a number of subsequent HCDC, PAC and NAO reports.
However, in November 2005, in a written reply, the then Min(AF) Adam Ingram stated that the Mk1 WAS under CC as of November 1993; and the Mk2 CC was maintained from that date until the accident. This resurrection, worthy of Lazarus, would have been a major programme, involving most of the Directorates in the little family tree I posted a few weeks ago. Anyone involved would surely remember it.
As someone whose job it was to try to maintain build standards (without funding) at this time, I can assure you that, far from being resurrected, the RAF (especially, as they controlled funds) were actively running down this process. In fact, the 2 Star responsible threatened anyone who voiced an opinion that, inter alia, we should try to make kit safe, with disciplinary action. (A threat which still hangs over staffs today, again confirmed in writing by Ingram, Ainsworth et al).
So, in addition to the usual lies, we have a situation whereby the MoD (a) knowingly compromised safety in the years before the accident (b) in the days immediately preceding the accident refused to take Boscombe advice that the aircraft should be made airworthy, and (c) in the following years, to at least July 1999, apparently did nothing to correct matters.
Perhaps the most damning confirmation is this. The procedures for maintaining CC are laid down in Def Stan 05-57. But there is another Def Stan laying down the wider procedures for maintaining the Build Standard, of which CC is but one part. Try asking D/Stan for this Def Stan, and all the specifications it calls up. They topple.