shortfinals;
but at least it would reduce the fear of going back to basics and remind pilots who have been starved of practise what power settings and attitude provide a good steady approach.
It doesn't take very much to keep current but it does require frequent practice. Our manuals state that the automation should be employed from just after takeoff right through to the end of the landing roll, (impossible in Canada; here we still have NDB and LOC Only approaches) and exhorts the crew that they must "maintain situational awareness", which, I think, is as silly as saying crews must continue to breath in order to maintain consciousness.
SA is a mindset, a "way of travelling" and is not merely an SOP or a personal behaviour. That mindset comes right from the CEO of the airline on down to the employees, because people are going to do what they can get away with when under pressure to perform or cut costs. If "heat" from superiors is higher for lack of performance and high costs than it is for SOP non-compliance in the cockpit or on the ramp, then that's what employees will focus on - that's what bureaucracy does best.
SA isn't limited to the cockpit although absence of same has more drastic consequences. Ramp damage costs airlines tens of millions of dollars a year and results in injuries and sometimes even deaths. For some reason this seems acceptable; - that is the only conclusion one can draw because the level of damage hasn't materially changed over the years.
I'm not sure that those below the executive management level aren't listening. I think most are but if their concerns aren't the CEOs and Executives managers' concerns, they wont' be the concerns of anyone "down below". This whole matter speaks, of course, to SMS - Safety Management Systems, or, the "de-regulation of safety" by handing it over to private corporations to do on their own.
The FAA in the U.S. has already had some harsh reminders of what "stepping back" means. Canada has yet to learn this lesson.
Regulatory oversight belongs with the regulator, not with a private corporation which has profit, share price and shareholder value primarily in mind - within such a mindset all departments are seen as profit centers; the Safety Department produces "nothing" and just costs money so it is an early target for "efficiency cuts". "Expensive resources" such as educated and trained people and line pilots who are also safety specialists and who know safety work are avoided and inexpensive, inexperienced "interns" fill the boxes.
The illusion is created that there "is" a department, a successful ruse until there is an accident. And then, because the notions I discussed in the earlier post take time to unfold, it is not that difficult now for "blame" to be directed at the crew or to other circumstances such as weather, navigation, etc. The focus on organizational accidents is subtlely being shifted by two factors - the criminalization of accidents, (which means the prosecution of crews but not CEOs or Flight Operations VPs, etc), and the excusing of the organization itself which is struggling to stay viable in the face of increasing financial and economic pressures.
Within the aviation system there are of course wide exceptions to this view and the present state of affairs. Many organizations continue to maintain a healthy balance between the principles of aviation in which flight safety priorities are addressed, and economic health which keeps both investors and employees in mind. But the trend is now clear.
Further, I believe there is a direct connection between the degradation of flying skills/situational awareness, and the larger principles discussed here. I believe that this trend has just barely announced itself in the recent accidents we have seen.
Whether we see more or not is a matter of whether CEOs and their executives come to understand that they are in the aviation business first, and then the profit-making business, because an airline that doesnt' know what it's fleet is doing is risks passengers, employees and investors alike. When CEOs can once again talk aviation technical matters and flight safety work as well as they can talk market share and other legitimate airline business strategies, the flat-line that is currently the fatal accident trend over the past 25 years or so may remain flat-lined.
If the MBAs have their way and take their organization too close to the sun, the flat-line will trend upwards. It is aviation's way of teaching us all and the lessons seem to have to be re-learned by each new generation of MBAs and others who think they have the answers anew.
Though it is a stated corporate policy which apparently is supposed to save fuel as well as prevent approach and landing incidents, reducing/eliminating manual flying training in the recurrent training syllabus and telling pilots they must engage the autopilot from just after takeoff and disengage on the landing roll unless the sky is empty and the sun is shining is not only demonstrates an ignorance of aviation but ignores data to the contrary - that loss of skills is now a risk element which must be addressed; the present trend is proof of this.