Run Dry Testing
If I understand things correctly the test is carried out by running an otherwise perfect MGB on the test-bed with a fully functioning lubrication system and then stopping everything whilst the oil is drained. The test is then re-started with representative loads equal to something close to normal flight.
It is important to understand that this test is therefore one designed to experiment with a MGB that has simply lost all the oil and is otherwise undamaged.
When contructing training scenarios in the simulator I try to add a realsitic context, one that recreates the real world where you the pilot DO NOT KNOW WHAT IS GOING ON BACK THERE. You have a MGB with sensors and these, plus your eyes and ears are what guides your response.
If I have learnt anything over the years it's that the RFM is written by experts but is not read by the aircraft. The experts largely second-guess the failure modes expected based on their experience and their knowledge of the system design. There will always be failure modes that were not thought of by the experts and we, the trainers, must teach a more generic approach to this possibility thereby extracting, in the process, the very best CRM from the trainees. At the very least you come away from such exercises with an greater understanding of where the Emergency Checklist stands in the scheme of things.
Malfunctions and failures cannot be ordered up like a 'Burger-Meal-Suoer-Size-To-Go'. Many many malfunctions that I have experienced or read about are NOT per the text-book, were never contemplated.
Knowing that and with a streak of self preservation the obvious course of action if anything threatens your ability to stay airborne is to get on the surface. If the waters are rough and colour your decision making then we MUST look at THIS aspect of the equation and ask ourselves if we have it right yet. Was the survival equipment as good as it can reasonably be expected to be. Was the aircraft flying over a sea-state beyond the certification standards? How can we make a controlled landing on the water in adverse conditions as safe as possible so that the obvious decision to 'land immediately' can be taken without, or at least with as little fear as possible.
I bet the clothing worn underneath survival suits will henceforth be appropriate if it wasn't before and if it wasn't adequate why was that situation allowed to be?
I attended a Shell sponsored safety seminar many years back at which the head of IFALPA said "Ladies and gentlemen - we need accidents.......". He went on to explain that managements the world over only focus their attention and often only allocate additional resources when they are in that post-accident traumatised state. We may need that attention, may need those resources if we find there are things that need fixing, things that need further research or equipment that has to be bought. I hope that between them those associated with this unfortunate accident can find the resources to make improvements to the aircraft, to the safety equipment and to the protocols and procedures related to avoiding a repetition in the future.
G