What is the intent of putting in place Regulations like FAR29 (specifically Section 29.927) that set minimum standards other than to ensure a certain (sometimes critical in the case of MGB) redundancy is there when needed ? Surely we aren’t saying well it’s there because it says so on this piece of paper, but don’t expect to ever depend on it if you really need it ?
Is not one of the reasons these types of aircraft are chosen for offshore transportation in the first place that that they do offer that additional critical redundancy according to their FAR29 Certification, so if something bad happens really fast (e.g. you lose your MGB oil in a matter of minutes), there is that built-in additional time to get the aircraft down in a controlled manner.
From the time the crew first notices a loss of MGB lubricant, the aircraft, as Certified to FAR29.927, is to be capable of 30 minutes continued flight – it’s a design requirement, a testing requirement, and a FAR29 Certification requirement for any failure which results in loss of MGB lubricant. Aren’t these minimum standards, i.e. there may possibly even be inherent benefits over and above, but no failure below ?
I won’t second guess the flight crew’s actions relating to this tragic event and that will be determined by professional investigators who have first hand access to the many pertinent sources of information, but whatever happened after they first noticed loss of lubricant, should there have been more time available to them due to the built-in additional redundancy for the MGB as specified by the FAR29 Regulation ?
What types of redundancy systems are installed on these aircraft that protects the MGB against any of these failures ?
Are these systems designed to address multiple failure modes and are they standard equipment on all helicopters working offshore (albeit with a weight and $ cost) ?
Why only 30 minutes of continued flight – is that acceptable for hostile offshore flight times of over an hour to destination with no alternate ?
Surely the Regulations have not fallen that far behind current technology that we may be trading off potential critical redundancy for the sake of only having to meet minimum requirements which were introduced over 20 years ago ?
In an (offshore oil) industry that is cash rich, that continuously advances new technologies and has lobbying power like no other, things such as outdated regulations or a hands-off mentality are not issues that cannot be addressed ?
Lots of questions, and probably hundreds more out there – hope there are lots of answers that can help to make flying offshore safer for everybody.