PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - Helicopter crash off the coast of Newfoundland - 18 aboard, March 2009
Old 26th Mar 2009, 12:32
  #220 (permalink)  
Join Date: May 2005
Location: Europe trying to enjoy retirement “YES”
Posts: 372
Operator safety, maybe I am missing the plot, all operators are controlled by local regulation regarding minimum standards. Engineering in Europe EASA Part 145, engineering training requirements Part 147. Companies are continually audited by the authority on their compliance and they have to demonstrate that the required procedures are in place and that they are funded to comply. The system is policed in all companies by the required in house Quality Systems again continually audited by the authority.
Operations are again controlled by regulation, JAR now EASA OPS Part 3, licensing and training under EASA FCL regulations. Again continual audits and in house quality oversight.
Ignoring a shit load of other requirement and needed to have systems in place monitoring, recording and with oversight responsibility, maintaining a continued AOC and engineering 145 approvals is controlled to the requirements now in place.
Add to that the continual audit and input from the client oil company.
So if safety is being compromised in the interest of saving money increasing profit and winning contracts in what area are you inferring this is being done?
1. Legislation not being complied with.
2. Companies not complying with the regulations even though they have the systems in place.
3. Sub standard departmental control leading to failings.
4. Not enough cash available to support the required needs.
5. Training and certification of staff not to sufficient levels.
The list could go on. Feel free to add.
Safety can be improved by adding worthwhile and prudent controls to existing legislation.
1. Improvement to existing legislation governing machines in service and new type certificated machines.
2. Legislation that is written in a way to ensures that the intent is clear and not open to ways to bypass original intent.
3. Ensuring helicopters actually fulfil the requirements needed to certify.
4. Reduce the influence of the lobby effect and the interest of big business entities.
5. Review and improvement as technology develops.
Looking at the tragic event driving this thread, the root cause is a combination of a number of failings in the system, we can all see and by now identify.
1. Confusion and misinterpretation of the actual certification state of the affected bit.
2. The failing of a simple component part that caused oil loss and system failure.
3. Less than satisfactory advice to crew that may have influenced the decision making process.
4. Operating in a severe environment.
Again the list could go on.
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