Yep, it is that simple - in the light of more recent work, it is possible that something untoward was going on the cockpit.
VP - the ac attitude was NOT level but it was also not as one would expect if the ac was climbing in a incorrectly selected attempt to avoid the hill (eg shallow climb, as asserted by Day Wratten). Instead the ac probably had about 30 deg nose-up attitude, above 100kts, with 10 deg AOB and with an extra large bootful of rudder....why?
Yet, rather than climb into icing conditions above SA, everything else points to the crew having decided to staying VMC below, following the coast (an assessment that is widely accepted in hindsight). The crew would have been perfectly entitled to do this if VMC - visability possibly ok (if you believe the yachtsman), sea shore/lighthouse in view, next waypoint selected etc. But it is assessed that the crew didn't turn and slow down in time but we don't know why. As I've said before, either viewpoint is mostly conjecture. In the case of Hercules XV193, this element of uncertainty was enough for the BOI and the Reviewing Officers to stop short of apportioning blame, so why was ZD576 treated differently by the reviewing officers from the same Command?
Arthur (post 4151),
In those days the RAF could apportion blame after an accident if it was found to be in no doubt whatsoever. You will be glad to know that these days that option is no longer available to BOI or their Reveiwing Officers - but administrative action can be taken against someone deemed to willfully crass/negligent - ie an impromptu, unauthorised airshow or flying under bridges.
Nonetheless, it is arguable that now, as then, BOIs are not given the enough authority (arguably, TORs for BOIs can be quite limiting) to dig as deep as they would like, or are able - given their resources. That is, BOIs were normally limited to the local, 'active' "unsafe acts" and proximal conditions (flying into the hill) not the 'latent' organisational conditions (FADEC/DECU/UCFM and airworthiness conditions). Furthermore, it is often that new evidence, knowledge or opinions come to light (eg JT2, Boscombe's or S/L Burke's evidence) after the accident and which can put a whole different slant on the BOI findings (also the limitations of the Boeing simulation and Day/Wratten assumptions which were then taken as facts).
Looking back at some the HoL findings, I find it strange that, despite acknowledgement that the Day/Wratten 'facts' were shown to be 'less than wholesome', Messrs Day and Wratten STILL maintain their position; quite bizarre?! Now that they have retired (wasn't Day was still serving at time of HoL enquiry?), perhaps they can ease themselves away from whatever motivational pressures that drove their 'pig-headed stubborness to look facts in the face' (apologies to Gen Melchett)? How the MoD could respond to the HoL findings, as they did, beggars belief - but it is what we have come to expect of Hoon/Hutton/Ingram/Ainswort and the like!
Ultimately, if Lord Rifkind (Def Min at the time), can appreciate the fragility of the verdicts of the Reviewing Officers, why cannot they (and the MoD) do so themselves? I would wager that we would hold these gentlemen in a much higher regard as a result as it takes a truly brave and honourable man to admit his errors, especially in public and after such a long time bound by his own pride and perhaps, his obstinacy. These traits we could forgive - we are only human.