Some comments to the last few posts,
@ Towerdog, the high stress environment I was refering to was not the approach in good weather, but the stickshaker going off (completely unexpected) at low alt combined with several warnings (AP disconnect, GPWS etc). We can discuss that in all length, but to me that would be high stress.
@ BOAC, You are right, you're recovery procedure is the same as in my FCOM, Setting full power by the PF, to be monitored by the PM. If the AT subsequently pulls the PL's back to idle, you obviously haven't set full power. I agree with that!!
However, I can imagine that the lawyers will have a field day with it . PM me if you want, I'm willing to wage a small bet that once the dust has settled and law suits have been completed that boeing will quietly come out with a small amendment to the stall recovery procedure in the FCOM.
@ Flying heavy, Strangely enough there seems to be some differences in FCOM's. Mine doesn't say in the stall recovery to disconnect the AP, AT. Just to apply full thrust. It even has a note stating that if the AP is on to leave it on and allow the airplane to return to normal speed, followed by a second note that if AP response is unacceptable to disconnect the AP.
Just to be sure, I don't fly a A/C with the book in my lap, common sense is implied, just pointing out what the book says, because that's what the lawyers will do.
In my account of what happened I made a small mistake, I said the A/C intercepted the gs, the gear was lowered and flaps lowered, then the RA fault. This was wrong, the gs was intercepted and then the fault occured or the gear warning wouldn't have happened, my mistake.
I still think a stall warning at low alt is very stressfull, almost all emergencies, faults etc can be programmed. An unexpected stall cannot ( at least I think it cannot, I can be corrected though) Windshear at low alt, engine failures, RA's even unusual attitudes (had a scenario in the sim were we encountered wake turbulence wich threw the ac nearly inverted). Stall cannot be programmed though. I can still see how the FO pushed the PL full forward (with the NG that's all it takes) and pushed the yoke forward, the captain taking over at that moment (can't fault him for that, I think every captain would take over), him fighting the yoke monitoring the attitude display with all the bells and whistles going off in the background and the AT pulling the pl's back again.
Once again, I think there's nothing wrong with the automatics design, I don't think it was a high workload/stress situation. However the crew allowed it to became a high stress situation. Most pilots would have never allowed to get that far, but I wonder how many guys, once they got to the unexpected stall at low altitude would have made the same mistake. It's not a subtle hint that most guys would have made the same mistake, I only wonder how many guys would have.