An Explanation of the Seemingly Inexplicable
Rockhound
Re your comments above: "Surely the crucial question is, what circumstances led to this mindset? Why were the pilots satisfied that no error had been committed and all was in order?"
Although I realise that visibility was down to 400 to 600 metres, they only had visibility through the forward area of the windscreens being swept by the wipers. Sometimes, on a dark clear night you lose depth perception and a busy airfield can be swimming in a sea of lights.
And on a dark and rainy night, you can tend to be transfixed by (and fixate on) the few things that you can see.
I remain unconvinced that no runway edge lights were on. That conclusion seems to rest upon what was seen by distant security cameras.
But it doesn't change the fact that an opening was left and a crew was duped through it. I'd guess that the "dominant perception"
syllogism was operative and that what they were looking at simply failed to register against the background of "getting on with the show".
Syllogism: In Logic. A form of deductive reasoning consisting of a major premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion. It more often than not is a subconscious thought process.
(All humans are mortal, the major premise, I am a human, the minor premise, therefore, I am mortal, the conclusion)
begets in this case (subconsciously) the dismissive mindset of:
We are lined up for departure on the runway and cleared for take-off.
What we must be seeing out the front must be that runway.
Therefore there is no safety problem nor cause for alarm or query.
i.e. a simple failure to mentally register any inconsistency.... no alerting mechanisms present at all. Because the predominant concern is about darkness and weather and visibility, a perverse mechanism of reassurance is always tending to suppress any disquiet (the PVD....). That's the sentient side of human nature.
Alarm generators must be active stimulants. The singular red depressurisation warning light on a Beech 200 does not flash and is not attention-getting and, although double filamented, is no substitute for an aural alarm. That's probably what caused the "failure to pressurise" overflight (and death of eight) in the Payne Stewart type crash ex Perth last year. The sun was from over the pilot's shoulder and washing out that light as he climbed out in the late afternoon on an Easterly heading. It's a good example for the assertion that "alarm and warning generation" is a wholly active (and never a passive) affair. You can probably think of numerous other examples where this suppression syndrome consciously copes with the environmentals while the "dominant perception" syllogism perceptively accommodated the desired sense of well-being.
Simple Solutions in hindsight
They could have used a Dreadle Treadle hooked to pyrotechnics alongside the 05R threshold and still used it as an exit taxiway. (i.e. A B => A progression across the treadle lights off the fire-works yet an A => B progression for taxiing aircraft exitting 05R taxiway (across the same treadle) does nothing).