Having slept on it, I believe the AAIB interim Report no. 2 is rather odd.
If one believes in a total safety (non-commercial) attitude, then three cheers, but I do feel that the NTSB and FAA have "bounced" the proper authority, the AAIB, still that's the real world.
Just a look at the actual recommendations ;
Safety Recommendation 2009-028
It is recommended that Boeing and Rolls-Royce jointly review the aircraft and engine fuel system design for the Boeing 777, powered by Rolls-Royce Trent 800 engines, to develop changes which prevent ice from causing a restriction to the fuel flow at the fuel oil heat exchanger. (to which was added : ‘Boeing and Rolls-Royce have accepted the above recommendation. To mitigate the potential for a future fuel system ice accumulation and release event, to cause a blockage at the inlet to the FOHE, Rolls-Royce have developed a modification to the FOHE. The modification will improve the FOHE’s capability in the event of a fuel system ice release event.’)
Safety Recommendation 2009-029
It is recommended that the Federal Aviation Administration and the European Aviation Safety Agency consider mandating design changes that are introduced as a result of recommendation 2009-028, developed to prevent ice from causing a restriction to the fuel flow at the fuel oil heat exchanger on Boeing 777 aircraft powered by Rolls-Royce Trent 800 engines
Safety Recommendation 2009-030
It is recommended that the Federal Aviation Administration and the European Aviation Safety Agency conduct a study into the feasibility of expanding the use of anti-ice additives in aviation turbine fuel on civil aircraft.
Safety Recommendation 2009-031
It is recommended that the Federal Aviation Administration and the European Aviation Safety Agency jointly conduct research into ice formation in aviation turbine fuels.
Safety Recommendation 2009-032
It is recommended that the Federal Aviation Administration and the European Aviation Safety Agency jointly conduct research into ice accumulation and subsequent release mechanisms within aircraft and engine fuel systems
All very sensible, but the ones that interest me are numbers 31 and 32.
31 is sensible but a can of worms, it is open ended, but very important and likely to be long and expensive.
32 is the one that really worries me. It is non specific and non-urgent. However, having found potentially worrying new fuel/water/ice inter-actions there seems no worry over testing ALL aircraft/engine installations and establishing new rules for design and operation. VERY ODD. How does anyone know whether their aircraft is prone to this problem ?
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