Caz
My copy of Chambers Dictionary defines "Negligence" as "omission of duty, especially such care for the interests of others as the law may require."
I would consider that ignoring Orders or Instructions that you sign as having read and understood each month would be deemed to be negligence - as does my copy of Chambers Dictionary.
Quite right.
As such, I assume you agree with me that those who hold financial, technical and airworthiness letters delegation, who are required to make a similar written declaration when exercising those powers, would be equally guilty of negligence if they failed to do so – and far worse, if anyone abused their rank/grade/authority by instructing junior staff to make such false declarations?
I would hope no right minded person here would disagree, but please say if you do.
Now, go back to the years immediately before and after the accident and look at the benchmark rulings relating to these obligations. And please remember that, while the MoD(PE) Directorate responsible for Chinook was Director Helicopter Projects, in practice there were many other PE equipment and support Directorates who contributed (or otherwise), over which DHP had absolutely no control. (Including Boscombe Down, who were completely ignored). This is one reason why the 1 Star doesn’t sign the CA Release – it has to be someone at the top of the pyramid, with control over everyone.
For example, most of the equipment (avionics etc) in the Chinook was under the control of AMSO – Director General Support Management (an RAF AVM) to be precise. In December 1992 he ruled that civilian staffs could be instructed to ignore their obligations, and make false statements. In his own words, if you refused to lie (about financial probity, airworthiness etc) “I have made arrangements for you to be dismissed”. Nice. Wonder if the aircrews at the time knew of this. I know some did. There was a sudden interest in attending CWGs and CAGs.
The regs state a Safety Case (or safety argument) MUST be underpinned by a current build standard. It follows that one must maintain that build standard. Not in accordance with aforesaid 2 Star or his opposite numbers in MoD(PE), who were happy to cut funding in successive years leading up to the accident, culminating in a ludicrous situation whereby even safety critical tasks were refused funding or deferred. Who knows, the DECU connector may have been a deferred task because of this failure of duty of care and gross negligence, whereby senior staffs continued to claim the obligation to maintain airworthiness was satisfied, but clearly was not. The quite deliberate decision was – “We know it’s unsafe, but carry on chaps”. This is what led directly to a situation, as seen from a front line viewpoint, explained by Shy Torque;
1) There were no more Chinooks.
2) It was a higher management decision about aircraft needed to fly in an operational theatre.
3) They could get away with it.
4) The crews had little or no say in the matter.
See 2) – For “higher management”, read contemporaries and mates of those making the rulings I mentioned. The protected “club”.
At the time of the accident, an internal audit was being conducted, after a formal complaint had been lodged about the instructions being handed down. A couple of years later, the resultant report advised PUS that the complainant was 100% correct, and made a series of recommendations. It is a matter of open record (in the form of Ministerial and MoD letters) that in the following years, and to date, successive regimes in MoD(PE), AML, DPA, DLO and DE&S, supported by Ministers, have formally rejected these recommendations and continued to uphold the notion that staffs can be instructed to breach their duty of care. And, incidentally, that such fact can be withheld from BoIs. A number of recent accidents can be traced to these, and related, rulings. (Verifiable by reading the rulings in conjunction with the BoI reports, and mapping it all to the airworthiness delegation chain – something nobody does).
Bottom line. This is all about protecting senior staffs.