100% Please,
If you erroneously blame the radalt, then you should also erroneously blame:
The autopilot, for not being programmed to drop out when below a safe speed.
The autothrust, for not having an always-on alpha prot / alpha floor functions, and "Speed speed" callouts.
The displays, for not flashing a radalt discrepancy.
The dome light, for not flashing when peril is detected.
I have many thousands of hours in both seats of the NG (as well as the 320 series). I find the NG to be crude, nasty to fly, ergonomically challenged and generally a bit incapable during significant non-normals.
This is just about the worst bs Ive seen on this entire thread.It really annnoys me.The 737 is a fine workhorse with extremely good dispatch rates.The only reason that its not statistically the safest commercial jet in history is that pilots keep screwing the pooch.You really do have to know what you're doing when you fly it.
Boeing works on the KISS(keep it simple) principle.You,the pilot,must actually fly the thing,theyll help you out when and where they can but they wont hold your hand and if you screw up..dont call.
Dome light should never flash(more bs).I see no reason for including RA's in the comparator warning system(Baro alt,heading and AS are covered already..theyre your primary instruments).As for alpha floor,they have it but again its designed to be flown and controlled by the pilot.
Crude?You mean simple.
Nasty?You mean small flight-deck with no lunch table
Incapable during non-normal?You mean no ECAM checklist where you as a pilot dont actually have to think,reason and decide all on your own.
Back to topic.
Rainboe's comments,whilst correct,should not refer to crew directly or assign blame.The Dutch will work out what went wrong and the probable cause.Rainboe should not underestimate the little traps of automation that can confuse good pilots.The well-known ALT ACQ trap;on a GA if ALT ACQ is captured prior flap retraction the speed will revert to current speed in which case you could end up with flaps UP and not enough speed.Theres another stall scenario.Or if you approach FAF platform in VS and set missed approach alt in the window whilst still in ALT ACQ,the plane will maintain its VS rate and fly right into the ground.CFIT trap.
Personally,the failure to see RETARD instead of the normal MCP SPD on the AT FMA is minor although it would have spoken in volumes;a lot of people would do that.I think Airbus guys wouldnt because they rely more on what they see due feedback in limited channels.Its the failure to monitor A/S that is key.
Stall recovery is second.
i)How immediate was the response?Time in seconds from shaker-onset to recovery attempt.
ii)AT not disengaged?Why not?Startle factor..seat position.
EFSM(elevator feel shift module) hasnt been mentioned.Works above 100'RA with AP off and increases pressure to elevator feel computer to prevent pilots aggravating a stall situation.How much use?Would it have triggered considering the RA false reading?