Originally Posted by SASless
I think you are saying you made your own decisions re weather aborts or are you saying you were the only pilot to refuse to depart due to weather? Your post was a bit confusing.
Why would there be dissent but no repercussions?
Either you had the required weather and forecasts or you did not. Weather minimums are simple.
Marginal weather is where it gets sticky....and perhaps subject to differing opinions but I think a proper safety culture would support the "No Go" vote in those cases and challenge the "Go" vote if advancing safety was the basic issue.
I was, at times, both: the only one flying; and the only one NOT flying. I had rational justification for both decisions. In 13 years I was questioned only once by management. That individual believed that the weather was legally flyable, he expressed that opinion, and that was the end of it. It was my call to make, I made it, and it was respected as such in all circumstances. The point is I could have it both ways, and that was the
only time it was questioned.
Next, I'm reading a lot here about S76 windshield substitutions, limitations, etc. as a factor in this particular accident. I'd be very surprised if such is proven, based on my experience with PHI's Training Department. If a limitation existed, it was taught and adhered to. As an example of the company commitment to safety, for the first 5 or 6 years I was with the company, fuel minimums were "Beach and 30" at
all times. Outbound, and/or local in the field, you had to keep sufficient fuel to return to land and then another 30 minutes- none of the competition did so, that was a significant competitive disadvantage.
At the time I was associated with the company, training was first class. At that time, small ship pilots in Bells were kept abreast of 7 variations of the 206- The B; BIII; 'B3' (a PHI mod bringing a B to BIII equip); any of these on fixed floats; 206L; 206L1; '206L-30' (PHI L1 to L3); 206L3- ALL the limits; all the differences; systems; normal and emergency procedures, not to mention 'green hubs' and 'grey hubs'.
A regular feature of a class was argument with the provided material by line pilots, new and old- to encourage a stimulating and professional environment, as well as add to the soundness of training material. If a line captain carried the point, the syllabus was changed immediately. You can bet the Training staff knew their aircraft very, very well- they knew they would be challenged, and would be an arbiter on all manner of issues that arose in the field between re-quals.
The medium/IFR side was run in similar fashion and as sound in training, in my limited experience of less than a year.
The company provided training on par if not better than any other I ever got- including the military and Flight Safety, although PHI and those others is apples and oranges.
No, PHI wasn't as well equipped as the North Sea- but the Gulf isn't the North Sea, is it? That comparison is, or was, unfair in several regards- how many North Sea pilots do 100-150 landings a day, routinely? It is a very different operation, but that doesn't mean it's a lesser operation in any fashion. I believe that the level of training and support for the line pilots promotes a very safe operation. At one point, for a year or two, PHI's fleet accident rate, based on landings, matched (or beat some) US Part 121 operators.