the fact surely remains that as with the Helios 737 crash this event could apparently have been avoided by clearer, more distinct and less ambiguous warning system design by Boeing.
No,I dont agree.As 737 pilots have pointed out,theres no data about the effect of #1RA status on AT operation in the pilots OM manual,only in the MEL and AMM.They dont think as a pilot you need to know this.Why?Because failure of #1RA might disengage the AT or engage it in the inappropiate mode but it will never obviate the pilot's responsibility to monitor the A/S.They mention it in the MEL and warn the pilot to use manual thrust in case of RA#1 anomalies.(unfortunately,the recurring RA problem was never put in the Tech Log,a fact that will figure highly in the report Im sure)If the pilot wishes to gain a deeper understnding of his systems,he may self-educate himself by getting hold of a copy of the AMM.Probably way too complex for a mere pilot anyways.
Rhythm method,
Wouldnt you say its safe to say that BOAC is/or has been a 737 pilot?I think its pretty obvious.
BOAC,
I think its possible that the Turkish TC knew that #1RA would affect AT operation without having to consult his MEL (ie he did know his aircraft in theory) but that he just didnt apply that knowledge in practice due to the fact:
i)approach may have been rushed..failed to check FMA status
ii)the AT physically engaged..or didnt disengage..and as it remained engaged he assumed hed get his alpha floor too
iii)never seen a RA false reading before,only a failure