If we can disregard the obvious "fly the plane" just for a second and concentrate on the automation issue a bit.The gear warning at 1950' proves they were F5 or worse at 6.5 miles.Probably a speed limitation imposed by ATC.Lets assume they configure right after this to get rid of the warning.Speed would be coming back from F5 speed to Vref 30+5 so initially they would be happy with the TL's idle scenario.Initially.
Lets look at the 2 pilots:
i)TC...lets assume is PM,hes configuring aircraft,talking to ATC,talking his student through the procedure,performing the landing checklist..perhaps he waits to see if the student remembers to call for it,we dont know.He knows the AP is engaged and the localizer and path are captured.He knows the AT is engaged and so to his mind he has minimum speed reversion protection(alpha floor).What has he missed in automation-terms in the "rush"?The top left FMA(AT status) is showing "RETARD" and not "MCP SPD"(GS cap engages AT in this mode).Mode confusion."RETARD" is seen only at 27' on a single CH approach or 24' on a dual CH approch."RETARD" followed by "ARM" is seen in a LVL CHG or VNAV descent from altitude.The picture isnt right but he misses it.
ii)Student pilot..is PF.Hes listening to the running commentary from the instructor,responding to the checklist and supposedly monitoring the automation and flightpath.But what is his scan?A lot of FD fixation and not much else perhaps?Does his scan include the speed tape,the speed trend arrow,the AT status FMA?If it does,and he does attempt to manually increase thrust half-heartedly,the AT computer will fight him and try and retard the levers at 3deg/second.Does he continue to fight it,unaware that all he need do is disconnect it and push them up manually?Does he dare take a command decision like that?Sounds crazy I know but you know what they say about the "meek" inheriting the earth?Can one's own perception of oneself as a lowly trainee reduce you to this level of humility?probably not.More likely that his scan didnt include the speed tape.
When they get the stick-shaker(at 450'?)and are rudely awakened from their total loss of SA,the TC has to react swiftly and fly the stall recovery to perfection to stand any chance.Against him are:
i)startle factor..refusal to accept that this is happening to you..momentary paralysis as seen in Everglades and other crashes
ii)strong pitch-up moment caused by applying full thrust on B737..his target pitch attitude is only 5 degrees and hes fighting a lot of trim and pitch-up moment
The FD BOV mentioned in the initial report relates to system knowledge and should have been a trigger to the distracted TC that things werent right.Unfortunately,this level of detailed knowledge is often buried in the AMM and not the OM....BOV is commonly caused when the master FCC is in LOC and the VHF nav panel is selected to a VOR on the slave side or vice-versa.Pilots will know this.But there are more than a dozen scenarios that cause BOV for pitch and roll and one of them is radar altimeter signal invalid for more than 2 seconds with FD in LOC mode.Does "invalid" mean failure or incorrect reading?Does the software detect a discrepancy beween the 2 RA's and issue the BOV order?I dont know.You wont find that kind of data in the OM.AMM and MEL are very useful sources for detailed systems knowledge.OM skims the surface.