NigelOnDraft
I am intrigued by your <<an IAS is the "safe" range >>.
Sorry, I didn't make myself clear. I'm talking about the first post-stall situation.
As far as we can extrapolate from the graphs, after the stall warning onset, there is a general trend for the pitch to decrease, hence my assumption that there was no load factor involved there...At time :19, the speed is well above 120 kt and I don't expect the warning to have lasted that long.
Of course,
TyroPicard's remark :
If you look at the CAS trace the CAS does not exceed the stall warning value until 15:45:16, at which time the a/c has a positive pitch rate which would increase Vs - the stall warning stopped 3 seconds later after a period of more constant pitch. Seems OK to me.
is as valid as mine.
I don't pretend that I'm right, I'm just trying to picture the events as they would have appeared on their instruments and the general cockpit atmosphere.
NigelOnDraft
For a Test Crew, briefed and prepared (?), and knowing that Alpha Max was to be 107K +/-3K it is, to me, incomprehensible.
Please bear in mind the aircraft was in a slight descent, 99K and a pitch attitude of 18.6nu... surely some alarm bells should have been ringing..
Yes, the first really puzzling aspect of this accident... Loss of SA ?
But immediately, the next question would be "Why the loss of SA ?"
PS : I've just discovered
Sindhu's post and whether the expert sent by ALPA will help or not remains to be determined. There is though a damning sentence in that press release which was initially used to protect the crew :
The report says a lack of rules about such check flights have meant crew qualifications are not stipulated and test procedures can be improvised
improvise ?