To this we can add a concept that I once termed "automated interference with basic airmanship". During the Roselawn investigation, we determined that the upset initiated when the flaps were retracted following the overspeed warning during the descent. The captain was heard on the CVR to say "I knew we'd do that" in reference to the overspeed warning.
We found the flap handle in the wreckage selected to flaps 15. Simple good airmanship told the crew to restore the configuration to where it was before the upset initiated. Unfortunately, ATR at that time had a system in place that prevented the flaps from extending when the airpeed was beyond the appropriate speed limit. Had this not been in place, there is a chance that a recovery might have been completed.
Now, I am well aware of many other things the crew could have done, having been involved in the investigation from the night of the accident. But I have always been bothered by the idea that those fellows tried to do exactly what we are discussing here...common sense airmanship...and were inhibited by automation.
I have to confess a preference for the Boeing philosophy...two quick flexes of my thumb and I'm back to the 727. And it is fair to say that since 1994 a lot has been learned by all regarding the role of automation. But I sure do like being able to strip it off completely.