the systems were fed poor data from malfunctioning AoA sensors; the systems eventually did realize that, concluded that something must be wrong somewhere, and handed the situation to the pilots.
Understood / accepted the systems were not capable of handling the situation that was experienced. However, why would Airbus programme the systems to abandon functions and leave the stabiliser control surfaces in such an
extreme setting. OR were they stuck in that position which was what caused the systems to abandon processing.
My concern is that whether through painting, ice or some other things, some sensors may malfunction. Certainly in operational circumstances, rather than test as this is, one would hopefully not be near critical energy situations like this. However a different combination of circumstances could see the situation occur in line ops. I can't believe an amber message is enough feedback for the crew to notice and overcome and anyway isn't the remedial action better conducted without that extreme stabiliser setting?
I hope to see some recommendations for Airbus to improve their automation, in particular the abandonment of function.