DC-ATE;
The issue is not "automation", no more than the issue for weapons-related deaths is "gun".
The Airbus 320/340 fleet type has no worse, no better a safety record than other manufacturers' current types, (NG, 767, 777, etc) and it is certainly better than steam airplanes. Your case against automation in favour of older designs is simply not being made and is showing up as prejudice vice a well-argued point with evidence.
I've flown both as you know and hear very well what you are saying. Frankly I am very happy in both types but they require vastly different training regimes, checking, standards and situational awarenesses. When I first began I flew mostly with WWII captains who were as crusty as you can imagine - there wasn't much in the way of CRM and we were known as the captain's "sexual advisor"...when he wanted our f....g advice he'd ask for it. SOPs were for the obediance by fools and the airplanes were heavy on the controls - the DC8 was a direct cable to the elevator tab and elevator, as you know. It didn't have speed brakes but that didn't stop at least two crews from finding out "the hard way". Horizontal stabilizer jams or full-travels caused a few accidents then, as now - the Perpignon A320 accident apparently being the most recent - plus ça change, plus c’est le même chose...back then there were a lot more CFIT's, probably the same number of loss of control, more mid-air collisions and weather related accidents, probably less maintenance-related accidents and probably more human-factors related accidents.
So...while it is true that the old designs like the DC8, DC9 were WYSIWYG airplanes in which the pilot's inputs to the controls and fuel-control units were "direct", (with only hydraulics intervening), they were not any better and in my view were considerably worse than the equipment we have flying today.
The key is training, training, training, enforcement of the strictest cockpit discipline and SOPs, robust checking to make sure that is happening, and a regulator who is involved in a country's aviation industry instead of dumping it's oversight responsibilities onto private operators to look after (while they're trying to make a profit).
I will, and have, accepted all arguments against automation's faults. I have written and argued aggressively regarding the 320's faults when I first began flying the type - when it had yet to have installed the full VNAV Standard and all we had to descend with was manual flight, Idle-Open Descent, (FlCh for the Boeing) or Vertical Speed. I criticized the training heavily, mainly because the instructors were never more than 24hrs ahead of their students and Airbus refused to engage what I thought was an important safety dialogue at the time. I know and can describe faults with the 320/340 design just as well, perhaps better, than those who prefer cable-pulley-bellcranks-flying tabs.
There are faults with all designs but that does not render them poorer than WYSIWYG designs as described. To claim so simply does not square with the historical record and perhaps broadcasts a slight scent of the luddite.
It has been pointed out here quite adequately elsewhere that these design philosophies are the result of the demand for cheaper and cheaper airline tickets. The public has been fooled by the "lo-cost" myth, perpetrated by fly-by-nites and other pretenders while the pejorative term "legacy" was applied to those who had proven themselves with decades of successful, safe flying. The airlines thus demanded from the manufacturers cheaper operating costs and the only way to do that comes from weight reductions, better airfoil design (including more efficient high-lift devices for slow-speed regimes on takeoff/approach) and more efficient engines - a ducted propeller, really, with only about 20% to 30% of the "push" coming from the actual jet engine.
When the micro-processor/digital revolution went "public" around the late 70's, it became possible to control very large machines and aerodynamic forces with no physical (muscular) input beyond the movement of a tiny control or switch. Software engineers found ways to write robust software that controlled both engines and flight controls and, ultimately, fly-by-wire migrated from the military to civilian transport, hugely reducing weight penalties and making both airlines and passengers slightly happier with "lo-cost" fares. I have old 1958 schedules which have the same numeric price from Vancouver to London as exist today which means the actual cost of doing business is about one-tenth what it was at the zenith of the cable-pulley-bellcrank era.
In my view, the brilliance of what has been done in terms of both costs and safety levels is nothing short of astonishing. So guess what really kills me more than anything, both as a captain and as a philosopher? ...It is the passenger who will whine or even feel entitled to verbally abuse my flight attendants about a 20 minute mechanical delay on a trans-con or international flight when that same passenger probably waits the same if not twice that amount of time for a seat at a favourite restaurant on a Friday night.
I need evidence to substantiate the attitude that automation is a bad approach to design and that former designs are better.
I intend this as a collegial offering as I know you know - a friendly view from a guy with a foot in both types.
PJ2