Originally Posted by
protectthehornet
I'm not sure what the guy was saying about DC8 throttles not moving...unless he meant that they had to be moved by hand.
I didn't think I had to specify but yes, that's what I meant. The point I was making was, in the concurrent discussion regarding automation levels, non-moving thrust levers/throttles are not new - those who have been around a while are already familiar with manual throttles and use thereof. The A320/340 series aircraft are the same when on manual thrust levers but the automation is, like any aircraft system when used with awareness and knowledge, a significant safety advancement. Flying the 320 in fully manual flight (no flight directors, no autopilot, no autothrust) is no different than flying any other transport category aircraft in manual flight. It takes a pilot, not a "flight deck manager" to do it safely...
DC-ATE;
Thank you for your response, much appreciated. Permit me a bit of latitude:
First, I want you to know that I find your posts very engaging and of great interest. I believe we're about twenty years apart if I recall a comment you made earlier perhaps on another thread, thus about half my career was spent flying "steam" on the DC9, DC8 and 727, and half was spent flying "partial automation" (767, L1011) and "full-automation" (relatively speaking) on the Airbus 319/320/330/340-300/500 series so I have a foot in each camp so I both appreciate and understand your approach and comments. Disagreement is, at least for me, a starting point, never a point of parting ways.
When I first began flying fully-automated aircraft I was extremely skeptical and was not silent about the kind of training and understanding being handed to new candidates on these aircraft nor was I the least bit impressed the arrogance of Airbus which summarily dismissed early commentary from experienced professionals on many potential automation human factors errors lying dormant in their design.
The airplane itself requires a minimum of six months steady flying to achieve a bare understanding and a year to feel comfortable. In my view and experience, one can "strap the airplane on" after about 3 to 5 years and play it like a concert grand but for many such levels of automation do not come naturally, either philosophically or operationally and so takes steady work.
Having flown the Airbus types for fifteen years I am wholeheartedly convinced that the approach taken and the design itself is extremely well considered and executed. No design is without it's shortcomings and resident detractors but the design must be critiqued from a basis of knowledge and experience - I think that is only fair; otherwise, what may appear to be nonsensical and "oviously faulty", is in fact a superb design when trained for and operated as intended.
My reference to the DC8 throttles as "non-moving" was an attempt to engage this larger dialogue - there were no autothrottles on the '8, and of course, they're moved by hand- it was never an issue then or now, the point being, neither are the non-moving thrust levers on the 320 series "an issue".
Your point regarding the mis-reading of the altimeter is absolutely spot on - it's a pilot thing certainly and I am certain you had no trouble reading the gauges but I would add, (and it's a small point in the overall discussion), when the design changed to the drum altimeter and all of a sudden CFIT accidents reduced.
That coupled with having their heads inside and low pay and all the other things wrong these days, just leads to unfortunate results
If I may be permitted one more tangential point:
Heads down and low pay are more than plain facts about this business and this profession after de-regulation - they are metaphors for a much larger and more serious problem now in its "post-seedling" stage showing signs of ripening.
There are, in the view of many including "Sully", gathering forces for a perfect storm where an increase in fatal accidents may obtain. Today it is marketing experts and accountants who make it into the senior executive. Airline executives in many cases are not only not knowledgeable about aviation and operations these days but cannot carry on an in-depth dialogue on how safety is done or what it takes to accomplish it.
That is not just my impression - I have heard it in dialogue with people (pilots in flight safety) at Boeing who would know. The comprehending support so crucial to those programs which produce "nothing", diminishes in favor of "cost control", a very short term project. It is as though those governing and directing airlines have forgotten that they are in the business of aviation and have forgotten where the present laudable safety levels have come from.
The testimony before Congress of Captain Sullenberger emphasizes this point very poignantly.
This may be tangential but, as this and other threads have touched on these larger matters as we collectively puzzle why another fatal accident has occured, the point is only barely tangential. (So the springloaded on this thread don't leap to connecting this broad comment with "specific causal factors" in yet another tragic accident, I assure you none of us know enough yet).
Originally Posted by
DC-ATE
And while this accident doesn't invole a FBW aircraft, I don't think I ever said that they were "difficult or obscure" to fly. I'm sure they (FBW) fly just fine. It's when things are not normal that correcting the issue seems to become a problem.
Okay, I accept that, thanks, DC-ATE. I gathered the impression that you were stuck at cables, pulleys and bellcranks and thought the A320 concept and design was a poor alternative - that is certainly the impression I have of others' who criticize the airplane.
As I state, my bet is, those who criticize most heavily either don't fly at all or haven't flown the 320 and so are emminently dismissable - even some (not all) comments from engineers; one simply has to have experience with the airplane before either lauding it or criticizing it.
So in your last comment, I understand precisely what you are saying and would agree with it because it is so obviously correct - if it were applicable. But the notion that there should be an emergency regime, "the so-called 'big red button' ", in which the flight/engine controls may be "in extremis", connected directly by cables to their respective services is folly and dismisses the vast and historical experience with hydraulic assisted controls, fuel control units and military experience with fbw systems, just to name a few.
The industry experience with the Airbus and Boeing fbw systems is clear - it is a successful approach which does not merit reconsiderations in terms of reverting to big-red-button thinking.
In my opinion, it just doesn't work that way nor is there the demonstrated need. In fact, it is rapidly becoming apparent that the Perignon accident shares a number of similarities to the Airbus A330 accident at Toulouse and likely has nothing to do with the design itself.