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Old 26th Feb 2009, 22:51
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Dick Smith
 
Join Date: May 2002
Location: Australia
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Seasprite abilities at the Office of Airspace Regulation

We all now know about the $1 billion fiasco in relation to the Seasprite helicopters. That is when a group of Canberra bureaucrats decided that we should uniquely experiment with the lives of military pilots, and in effect design our own software for a sophisticated marine helicopter project. Of course, after 10 years and the loss of $1 billion, the whole project was cancelled.

I wonder if some of those people have moved to the Office of Airspace Regulation. Have a glance at their Post Event Report on the Williamtown Arrangements During 2008/2009 Period of Operational Standby (See here). They have stated that as the radar did not work for a period of time – I think it was possibly one week – and there were no reported incidents, this shows that the Office of Airspace Regulation’s original plan (to go ahead without a radar display and with an Air/Ground Operator stationed at the civilian side of the airport) was satisfactorily safe.

The report states:

The fact that the Defence CA/GRS operated without a radar display for a quarter of the POS, without any increase in safety incidents or other impacts, indicate that a NAL CA/GRS would have been equally acceptable as a solution over the POS.
It is as if a child had written it. How could one week of data give any relevant information for this experimental airspace system?

Imagine if Qantas said they had a shortage of pilots and wanted to operate in and out of Williamtown with only one pilot in their airline aircraft. Imagine if after one week they said, “There have been no incidents so this is obviously proven safe.”

It appears that the people at the Office of Airspace Regulation don’t understand probability. You can go for many years without air traffic control in some places before you have a horrendous result.

Of course, without the radar operating – which is what they claim – they would not know if a serious incident did occur. Let’s say two aircraft (one without a transponder and with the radio on the incorrect frequency) got to within 100 metres of each other. If the pilots didn’t see each other – which can happen – no incident would be reported, but it could hardly be described as safe.

It would appear that the Office of Airspace Regulation has been captured by the bean counters in the airlines and at Airservices – i.e. save every dollar you can. Is there another explanation?
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