Hi Werbil:
I think that you and I are pretty much converging to agreement on this limits topic.
In your most recent post, you mentioned climb limits that were recently introduced by PWC and Cessna. I can well appreciate the rationale behind this is, because my own experience with the small PT6A family (which is with the -27, a pretty close cousin of the -114A, which I believe is a slow-turning version of the -34) is that crews are far more likely to inadvertently exceed engine limits during the climb phase of flight than during any other phase of flight.
It sounds to me like this problem was happening on your aircraft type in the past, based on your comment that now you are observing margins of between 25° during climb and 40° during cruise when operating at the (new) maximum calculated power limits.
The drum I have been beating all along is that crews need to be fully educated concerning what engine limitations are, and they have to know both sides of the story - in other words, there is no benefit arising from an operator emphasizing 'restrictive' limits but not fully explaining and fully permitting 'permissive' limits. The starting limitations I quoted earlier are 'permissive' limits, in the sense that they exist to allow the crew considerably more operating freedom than might be first apparent from looking at the gauge.
Another good example of a 'permissive' limit is the acceleration limits that are published for torque and T5. In the case of the -27 (and probably the -114A as well), the pilot has a very generous torque (68.8) and T5 (850°) acceleration limit to allow him or her to make a rapid forward movement of the power lever in the case of a go-around, windshear, or failure of one engine on a twin. Despite the presence of these acceleration limits, I have observed many pilots very carefully and very gingerly advancing power levers during a go-around or during windshear avoidance because "they don't want the pointer to go into the red". These observations have been made over the course of about 5,500 hours of full motion simulator instruction that I have given in a -27 powered aircraft.
It is interesting to note that the -27 engine operator who continues to hold the 'world record' for highest TBO on that engine - 9,500 hours TBO, based upon PWC incrementing the TBO over the 20 year history of that operator using a fleet of 25 of those engines - made every single takeoff at full calculated power. This is why I reject any suggestion that 'babying' the engine, or forcing pilots to abide by arbitrary limits imposed by company management (as opposed to the airframe manufacturer or the engine manufacturer) is wrong.
You wrote: "The information to our CP came from a P&W employee at a P&W engine course. Who do you suggest would be better to listen to?" I suggest that we only listen to what is written in the publications issued by the airframe and engine manufacturers. I have no doubt that whatever the PWC employee said was sincerely meant, but, if it is absolutely correct and if it is germane to operating their engine, hey, PWC would have put it in the book. I have been in a similar situation to that employee in the past - I wrote the FlightSafety training manuals for the aircraft type that I specialize in, and I currently write, edit, and maintain the AFM for that same aircraft type. I have my own personal opinions, as is obvious from what I have written in this thread, but in the end, the only opinions that matter are the ones that I manage to get approved by the regulatory authority and published in the AFM for the aircraft. The same thinking applies to PWC.