SAS was the launch customer, and struggled for a long time with the first deliveries. The two first accidents were due to a design fault admitted by Bombardier.
This third accident was different. The so called new and withheld information was already included in the preliminary accident report from November 2007.
http://www.hcl.dk/graphics/Synkron-L...K_03112007.pdf
Prior to the accident the SAS mechanics used a component from a spare part pre-assembled for the nose gear, on the main gear. This may have contributed to the failure in the hydraulic system, which was initially caused by a loose O-ring traveling in the system.
The Danish authorities mentioned (SLV) is the Danish CAA. They are not responsible for the accident investigations in Denmark, and therefore it makes little sense to question what information they excluded or will exclude from their report.
The question now is whether the procedure used by the SAS was an allowed procedure or not. The representative from the Danish Accident Investigation Board stated that there is no evidence of sloppiness within SAS, but that the guidelines may have been unclear. If he was referring to SAS or Bombardier guidelines is not clear.