I would point out that the North Sea at night in limited viz is a very difficult environment to operate in. As PIC, I am quite happy 'looking in' until the very last minute. Trying to take over visually too early with inadequate or limited visual references is a very testing experience. At those times, it is the crew member on instruments that will be the one to ensure the aircraft isn't sinking towards the water or losing airspeed. You certainly won't pick up those cues looking outside.
Totally agree. I am quite sure that most of us (myself included) who fly offshore at night have become SD due to trying to fly with visual references too early. Results of this can be varied usually we simply recognise straight away, and revert to instruments. What needs to be established is that it is not always entirely clear cut as to why or when you look up. Yes we fly to MAPT, but very often you are visual before, and we are all different and have differing abilities, and then the weather varies. So many variables make this a judgement call very often. Procedures differ from operator to operator, but the human condition is always involved. It is very difficult to make a 100% solid procedure here, especially when hand over of control may or may not be required. Recognition of the condition of SD is the key, but in practice very difficult, as it has a habit of creeping up on you. There is always the go-around option, and we hopefully all do this - no shame there. This is a simplistic view though. Throw in some more factors. There IS commercial pressure - FACT. There are cultural issues in the industry. this may be the simple perceived innocent comments from the customer, supposedly in jest about the operator. Weather reporting from the customer can be unreliable, we all know that. Add some fatigue, take away the nice daylight, put some loud noise in, have some unnecessary chatter in the background on 2 radios slowing down x-cockpit comms, add in a caution light, maybe something in the water with a light on. I could go on and on. My point being is that it is a very difficult environment, and there are constant distractions from all directions, many of which unpredictable and nothing the crew can do anything about. There is a lot going on in the cockpit. So whatever the cause of this was, blaming is not the answer. The crew are highly trained, and certainly did not plan to end up in the situation they did. None of us are risk takers. Those who are pointing fingers are showing a serious naivety of offshore operations. Statements about the lack of a warning and a mayday are frankly ridiculous. 500m from a rig at 300ft in fog, you dont have much time to brief the pax, put out a mayday, set 7700 then sort the aircraft out. Priority is always FTFA - fly the f###ing aircraft first, all else after. You may get to check the RADALT and call flare if you are lucky. There will be no single factor here. As with most accidents it will be a very long chain, and the poor crew are just a part in that chain, and unfortunately for them the most public part.