Beagle,
Capt Marty (RIP) was between a rock and a hard place. I most sincerely hope that I never have to face the scenario that he and his crew did. I'd like to state that we are now looking at this horrific situation with 20/20 hindsight. And we are dissecting the situation as such. It is my belief that Captain Marty was attempting his 'approach' into Le Bourget knowing that he had at 'catastophic' situation on his hands. Unknown to him it would seem that the F/E had shut down an engine that was producing power. (There was a fire warning on that engine.) Normal SOP's would seem to dictate that an engine would only be shutdown when ordered by the Captain, but there may have been some divergence from SOP's in this case.
Capt. Marty and his crew would have been trained for (in the case of Perf 'A' A/C the loss of one engine on T/O). To the best of my knowledge there is no training for losing two engines at max weight, with the gear failing to retract, and a raging fire which has (unknown and obviously untested) effects
on the performance of the A/C.
a)Was the ac over its maximum certified structural take-off weight when it began its take-off roll? No it wasn't. But it would seem that it taxied out overweight.
b. Was the 8kt tailwind sufficient to reduce RTOW to a figure below that of ATOW?
This one did shock me when I first heard about it, but I am told (by sources that have a British origin and all that) that by all reports the A/C was within the limits. This is becauase the authorities have 'apparently' looked at the actual wind that prevailed at various locations at CDG at the time.
c. Are current AF SOPs adequate to prevent uncommanded engine shut downs at critical stages of flight?
I don't know the answer to that question, but I would ask you if any airlines SOP's are adequate. Unfortunately we are dealing with very frail human beings here.
d. Is current AF CRM training adequate to prevent an aircraft taking-off outside scheduled performance limits?
I can't answer that question, but I would ask the same question of any other airline.
e. Are CdeG runway inspection standards now adequate.
Yes I believe they are, and they 'probably' were adequate at the time. (How did LHR's differ at that time?)
f. How far aft was the C of G (the Observer said more than the BEA), and what effect would this have had?
Insignificant, or so I'm told.
g. What was the effect of the missing spacer on the undercarriage?
It is my personal belief that this may have had a significant impact on the chain of events that led to the accident.
h. What would be the likely impact of taking off one tonne above structural weight, or six tonnes above RTOW? How reasonable is it to wonder whether this would have exacerbated or even caused the tyre blow-out?
Clearly taxing out in excess of the max structural weight (by one tonne) cannot be condoned but I do not believe it to be a significant contributury factor in this case.
The RTOW case would perhaps be answered by question 'a' above.
i. Have we been well served by the BEA and DGAC with their report and our own CAA who simply rubber-stamped it?
I really don't know the answer to that one either mate. The cynic in me says that there is a chance of a 'whitewash'. I do however truly believe that the CAA would only allow re-certification if they believed the A/C to be 'safe'. And, by the way, I believe the A/C to be safe and would fly on it tommorrow!
May I say that I believe that Captain Marty performed exceptionally well under the apalling circunstances. Let us hope that none of us fellow airman find ourselves in a situation similar to Captain Marty's.
As an aside I truly hope that none of the families of the crew involved in this terrible accident have access to PPRuNE.
Out of interest I have never, ever, been involved with the operation of Concorde. But I know a few people who are.
By the way I'm with 'Sick Squid' on his defense of the post by 'wallabie'. You could say that I'm not too keen on 'vultures' picking on the remains of carcasses.
Regards
Exeng