In addition to being overweight, was the aircraft also 'overfuelled'? Was the fullness of the tanks a contributory factor to the 'explosiveness' with which hydrostatic shock caused the tank to burst?
Did the crew carry out their preflight duties adequately?
Did the crew recalculate weights, distances and speeds when informed of the change of runway? How seriously should we take it if they didn't?
Can anyone justify taking off downwind in these circumstances - and from that runway rather than the other - apart from noise abatement?
Can anyone quantify or even guesstimate the likely affects of being 1 or 6 tonnes overweight and behind the aft c of g limit on tyre performance, acceleration, and control speed, and on the speed at which departure became inevitable?
How critical was the piece of FOD ( a flat bit of metal) in causing the tyres to burst?
Would they have got away with it without an ignition source for the venting fuel?
Can anyone confirm, quantify or conclusively deny the early suggestions that there was a marked difference in BA and AF tyre use practises (retreads or not, no.s of landings allowed before replacement, etc.)?
What were the affects of the tailwind?
When the accident happened, much was made of a recent repair to a thrust reverser cowl. Which engine was that, and did it have any bearing on the accident, or on the crews response to the situation as it unfolded?
[ 29 August 2001: Message edited by: Jackonicko ]