CONCORDE ACCIDENT - PART 2
At the request of Capt PPRuNe, I have edited the list of questions which Jackonicko and I had posted in my earlier 'Concorde Discord' thread (now deleted). Please note that these questions are not intended to be in any way xenophobic, it is merely the truth which is being sought - OK??
Let's get back to the whole point of the thread:
1. RIP Capt Marty, his crew and passengers who died during an heroic attempt to make a forced landing at Le Bourget following critical failures suffered by F-BTSC.
2. Whilst the principal cause appears to have been tyre failure leading to subsequent hydrostatic shock rupturing a fuel tank and an external ignition source causing the resulting severe fire, are there other areas of the aircraft's operation which merit closer scrutiny? Specifically:
a. Was the ac over its maximum certified structural take-off weight when it began its take-off roll?
b. Was the 8kt tailwind sufficient to reduce RTOW to a figure below that of ATOW?
c. Are current AF SOPs adequate to prevent uncommanded engine shut downs at critical stages of flight?
d. Is current AF CRM training adequate to prevent an aircraft taking-off outside scheduled performance limits?
e. Are CdeG runway inspection standards now adequate?
f. How far aft was the C of G (the Observer said more than the BEA), and what effect would this have had?
g. What was the effect of the missing spacer on the undercarriage?
h. What would be the likely impact of taking off one tonne above structural weight, or six tonnes above RTOW? How reasonable is it to wonder whether this would have exacerbated or even caused the tyre blow-out?
i. Have we been well served by the BEA and DGAC with their report and our own CAA who simply rubber-stamped it?