The 40 Series '8 with RR Conways could use all four in reverse up to MCT. The 50/61 Series P&W installation could use MCT on the inners and idle on the outboards - same with the 63's. The 70 Series with the CFM installation cannot use reverse in-flight whatsoever. That's the reason for starting down real early...there was no way to slow-down-go-down.
The '8's "speedbrakes" weren't...they were spoilers only...from zero to about 80degrees deployment almost instantly.
The TIW accident resulted from a non-SOP "arrangement" between the captain and F/O who had flown together often - one arrangement was to pull the spoilers after landing - the F/Os compromise method, and the other was to arm them just prior to touchdown - the captain's method. The reason given was the rumour that spoilers had deployed in flight before, when the gear extended and oleo compression was sensed, (not wheelspin). The 40/50 series spoilers deployed only upon nosewheel oleo compression but the habit stuck.
When the captain said ok, the F/O pulled the spoilers at 60ft instead of arming them. The aircraft touched down with about a 25g hit as "felt" at the outboard engines and #4 broke off, while #3 broke but remained attached. The captain had already applied go-around power so the hit was instantaneous. They had they airplane under control and were coming around for another landing when at 3000ft sparking electrical wiring ignited the fuel draining out of the outboard tanks broken open by the departing engine. The explosion took off the outboard section of the right wing and the airplane rolled over and went in vertically.
The 8 was/is a fabulous airplane - a real pleasure to fly and an honest airplane. Can't think of a single accident that wasnt' human-factors related and instead caused by design.
411A, just curious, what was the comment by Davies made to Boeing in re the British Registry? I thought the world of Davies' book, (still have the first edition 40 years later). I'd love to know what he said...