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Old 29th Jan 2009, 16:37
  #3917 (permalink)  
walter kennedy
 
Join Date: Sep 2003
Location: Perth, Western Australia
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Arkroyal
<<A few of your posts seem tomake a point that the plan was not followed, based on the waypoints chosen, and your assumption that it was the crew's intention to actually overfly those waypoints.>>
Don't think so. I think waypoint A was of possible significance because it just happens to be at the “threshold” of a known landing area for Chinooks – an obvious inner marker to have as a waypoint if you were to land there.
The track of 035 mag that was on the HP's HSI course selector and that the a/c made good after its turn at the position of waypoint change (that was the track from this position to the impact area) would be the ideal line to take if approaching it (try standing at the site with a compass correcting mentally for the different variation back then and the local variation).
The HP's baro altimeter had a setting appropriate as a QFE for that landing area on the day (same elevation as Aldergrove); one RADALT warning was set at minimum.
So when I say that I think the flight plan was different it is that while they were supposed to be just en route passing by the Mull I think it is obvious that they were set up to land.
To help you picture this, there is an excellent photograph that appeared in the “Times” (Tuesday, January 9, 1996/Home News/ p 4) taken from above the crash site shortly after the crash: the scorched debris field is clear, and down below in the distance is the landing area that I have described previously (with photos so you should be able to recognise it); you can work out the orientation by the angle of the rocks and shoreline in the distance and the lighthouse. If you were aware of the landing area's previous use and the settings that I have mentioned above, would you not have the suspicion that this was a simple overshoot?
A fast approach to this landing area with a misjudgment of their closing range would explain it.
But would such experienced pilots attempt such a manouevre in conditions of the ground ahead fuzzed up with upslope mist such that visual judgment of closing range would be unreliable? Not without a trusted local reference or guidance of some form or other, in my opinion – something that they would have trusted more than the SuperTANS as they discarded waypoint A while it was still ahead – something that could have misled them, wilfully or erroneously. Any suggestions?
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