I know this is going to be a provocative post but I believe it must be said. Many postings on this site show what appears to be a total breakdown between the air traffic controller workforce at Airservices, and the management at that organisation. I believe I have an explanation for one part of it.
Look back to NAS 2b, where the Aviation Reform Group – which included the Chairmen of Airservices and CASA, and the then Chief of the Air Force (now Chief of Defence) – made a decision to move to the North American NAS airspace system. The NAS is quite definite. If Class C terminal airspace is to be provided, an approach radar facility must be included – with adequate staffing levels, proper training, and the hardware for both secondary surveillance and primary radar.
When Airservices made the decision to reverse the Class E airspace above Class D and make it Class C, it was obvious that they would also have to cover the cost of employing extra air traffic controllers, the proper approach radar rating, and the equipment.
It was considered at the time that they might try to cut corners, so the Minister gave a directive on 31 August 2004 requiring Airservices to provide the radar equipment if they were to operate Class C above D.
I, JOHN DUNCAN ANDERSON, Minister for Transport and Regional Services, pursuant to s.16 of the Airservices Act 1995, give the following direction to AA.
If:
(a) On the date on which this direction commences, a volume of airspace above Class D airspace above an airport was classified as Class E airspace, and
(b) After the commencement of this direction, AA re-classifies that volume of airspace to Class C airspace, AA must, in performing its function under s.8 of the Airservices Act 1995 of providing facilities and services, provide an operating ATC control tower at the airport and an approach radar control service at the earliest time one can be supplied and installed.
Amazingly enough, a small number of controllers (including Scurvy.D.Dog) caused an outcry – saying they could operate the Class C airspace without the extra staffing, without the extra training, and without the approach radar unit.
Can you believe this? It is almost as if these controllers thought they were some part of a charitable institution where they should offer to have more liability and provide Class C airspace without adequate manning and without proper tools.
The Airservices management jumped at the offer. If a boss believes his staff can be willingly exploited, the boss will normally comply by doing the exploitation.
The main claim by this small number of controllers was that they could provide Class C airspace for the same cost as Class E. Airservices immediately re-did a safety case showing this, and naturally the Class C (without any extra training and without the radar provision) won!
We now have Airservices controllers operating Class C airspace without radar, quite often with one sole controller, and with Class C airspace larger than the terminal airspace at O’Hare Airport in Chicago.
By running the campaign to reverse NAS and take on extra responsibility (when it was obvious that there was no more income to pay for additional controllers), Airservices saw that they could exploit – as stated above.
The airlines were delighted. Can you imagine if the pilots went to the airlines at the time it was decided that there should be a two pilot crew for 10 to 30 passenger planes, and said, “Boss, we don’t need two pilots, we can do it with one pilot!”
We now have a situation where in a place like Albury, a single controller in many cases is not only responsible for the traffic in the circuit area, but also for separating VFR from IFR traffic up to 45 miles away without Radar.
The Minister’s directive to provide a proper approach radar still remains, however I understand it is the controllers who have supported Airservices not going ahead with this.
What should happen is that the airspace should be Class E, and it should be made quite clear to the airlines that if they want controllers responsible for Class C airspace, they will have to pay the extra for manning, training and radar.
Once the Airservices management and airlines could see that controllers were prepared to take on a higher workload, and far higher personal risk of litigation of an error is made, they obviously decided that they could exploit the controllers in every way possible.
Could there be any other explanation?