Robert, sorry to be a ‘killjoy’, but any definition of a ‘new advanced aircraft’ will be outdated by what ever comes next.
An attempt to provide a specific set of limits for separate classes of aircraft could result in a chaotic or confusing regulatory system. An example is with JAR-OPS 1 part H, where AWO limits attempt to cover most flight guidance systems ranging from autos, FDs, to HUD, intertwined with airborne and ground system integrity, and capped with lighting requirements. (and why do the crews require currency?). The resulting tables/matrices are a nightmare for most operators and the compromise minima generally the lower of previous national limits across Europe. One might question if this approach is conducive to improving safety.
An alternative approach might be to consider what the operators require – avoiding the outrageous requests for bigger, better, and more. We might conclude that the current regulatory system is good enough if the resulting capability was more widely available.
Operating capability has been limited by ground systems, thus the advent of the new airborne facilities.
Current operational limits are based on the inherent guidance accuracy-integrity (ground/air), flight technical error (what the aircraft can achieve), and altimetry. Staying with this concept then there is no need to change existing obstacle clearances / collision risk models providing that the overall system meets the current accuracy-integrity values. Thus conceptually a GPS/FMS could fly Cat3 anywhere provided that the altimetry requirements are met – fix the approach terrain; not forgetting that flt guidance systems might rely on accurate rad alt (flat approach). The operators / airports must bear some cost for the improvement in capability.
The major operating advantage would be at airports with nil/non precision approach that can be improved to Cat 1, which is probably all that is required / justified. Thus, providing that any new advanced aircraft system meets the current criteria there should be no objection to the operation.
One current pitfall is that some believe that the new systems improve the overall integrity of the operation, i.e. single GPS/WAAS for Cat 3. The danger in this is that the regulators might believe that is justified based on a relatively good Cat2/3 safety record.
We should heed the warning of the safety gurus who cite that the most dangerous time is during periods of change and the failure to listen to ‘history’.