Tourist,
Every military equipment project, indeed probably every government project, involves a certain amount of manipulation of facts to suit a particular viewpoint. If you are so naive that a revelation of such "staffing" techniques leaves you speechless then it is fortuitous that you don't work in procurement because you would be mute.
Moving Australia was a fairly underhand tactic, but you seem determined to focus on that particular "outrage" in the face of all the other reasons that the RN carriers were cancelled. Primarily, the UK was almost broke and the Govt had decided to withdraw from the post-colonial responsibilities East of Suez to concentrate on the very real threat from the Soviet Union in NW Europe and the North Atlantic. In the years preceding that particular White Paper the Navy, in the shape of Mountbatten, made strong assertions about minimum ship size and numbers in pursuit of a replacement carrier fleet. In effect they priced themselves out of the market with their own ambitions, which in-turn encouraged a poverty-stricken HMG to seek other solutions until finally facing facts and deciding to withdraw from a global role. Once that decision was made HMG knew that bases such as Gan would disappear, and arguments about theoretical air coverage of the region were irrelevant.
You say:
To knowingly mislead about abilities, and thus lose a capability to operate in an area is tantamount to treason in my eyes.
but you are missing the fundamental point. The government made a conscious decision to cease operating in that area. That saved them the expense of maintaining bases, personnel and equipment (including carriers) required for such operations. Withdrawal from East of Suez did not take place because of an inability to provide air cover, it was a political decision mainly motivated by financial constraints. The RAF also lost a tremendous amount of capability as a consequence, including about half the transport fleet.
All three services exist to execute whatever policies the government decides to pursue. From the late-sixties through to the end of the cold war UK forces were deliberately configured to fight in the NATO area. The surface Navy's role became ASW in the G-I-UK gap and thus a strike carrier force was not needed. History seems to suggest that the primacy of the small-ship rankles within certain circles in the Navy who regard it as less prestigious. It seems to suit those with such a viewpoint to perpetuate the myth that the RAF engineered the demise of the carrier force, rather than to accept that the nation's defence posture as laid down by the government did not require such vessels.
Still, it is easier to maintain a sense of outrage at "The RAF" than at the dead or forgotten politicians of the Wilson government.