WEBF,
Technically Al Faw was not an amphib assault. The assault waves were all flown from a TAA in the Kuwaiti desert. Why? Because the carriers were kept outside seersucker range and that prevented the Sk4s from completing a round trip with a viable load. Therefore, only once the possible launch areas had been over-run did the carriers approach and make the logs ripple work. About 90% of the men/materiel on the first 3 waves were flown by RAF Chinooks, carried (and occasionally dropped...) over Kuwait. The Junglies worked their butts off (as ever) but were struggling to carry an effective payload. The RM hovercraft/landing craft had real problems with mined beaches, and this delayed the build up of combat pwr (esp in anti-tank weapons) which caused panic on day 2 when Int reported T-72s leaving Basrah! Curiously, these issues receive scant attention in RN histories...
NGS was successful in confusing all of the helo pilots as the traces were constantly changing; even worse, the bombardment served to churn more sand into the sky and further reduce in-flight visibility (down to 1000m in places) which was really nice at night.
There is a risk of "Black Bucking" Al Faw. The RN were in danger of a peripheral part in OIF as it was going to be a Land & Air focussed campaign. Al Faw gave them a piece of the action - but people must be careful not to overplay the card as, arguably, the RAF did with the Vulcan in the Falklands.
Al Faw could have been done totally from the land; Carriers were NOT necessary. However, as mentioned in other posts, it was nice to go back to an air-conditioned bed and not a tent...