I really had intended to avoid serious input on this thread at Christmas, since the more sensitive do get upset by what they see as 'Navy bashing'. And I wouldn't want to give any of those with whom I disagree on a friendly fashion indigestion at this time of year. Taking pot shots at weak minded newbies is just too tempting to avoid, however, which is why I've laughed at GullibleWings.
Yeoman,
Scrapping Harrier is not a "stupid place to find the money."
It nets huge savings (as long as you get rid of the whole lot, and all the support costs) just as binning SHar and Jaguar did. Nor was the sudden OSD extension from 2015 to 2018 ever credible - I had detailed discussions with the IPT years ago, and Harrier rear fuselages will be critical before then.
Jokes about Rocks apart (and I do like those!) the RAF Regiment continues to demonstrate its usefulness, and in an era of deployed operations and expeditionary warfare continue to justify what is a relatively modest price tag.
I'd be all in favour of dumping the "oversized F3 fleet". There are just two squadrons but I'd accept that is two squadrons too many. Unfortunately, though, you need five full-time AD squadrons to provide QRA and AD of the Falklands, so until we have more Typhoon squadrons (and since you want to use Typhoons for multi role and deployed ops, you want more than five squadrons) the poor old F3 is a necessary evil.
When the 'cannon fodder' in the Army are not commissioned, and are (in some areas) relatively unskilled, the pyramid is a full one, and the ratio of privates to Generals will be low. But the "ridiculously top-heavy officer corps" of the RAF exists because the 'cannon fodder' are aircrew - mainly officers, while the bulk of the NCOs in this technocratic service are highly skilled and educated. In such an organisation, you effectively just have the top part of the pyramid, so ratios are different.
Gullwings
There are a number of reasons why the 'One Nation, One Air Force' model makes sense.
The core business of the RAF is air power. Flying and delivering effect by air is the raison d'etre of the air force, and are the key skills/knowledge areas demanded in its leaders. In both the Army and the Navy, air power is peripheral, and aviation experience and expertise is viewed as being less important than cabbage-eating or ship-driving. There is little career progression for dedicated aviators, and though there are plenty of high calibre RN and AAC people who opt to stay aviating (many of them to be found here on PPRuNe), there is inevitably a dilution of experience and expertise as some of the highest calibre blokes leave to go and drive ships or do whatever the cabbage eaters do.
The chain of command understands and knows how to use air power. It does not mis-use assets, and does not allow aircraft to be diverted to act as the Colonel's taxi.
The RAF has the support and engineering infrastructure required to get the most out of the most complex platforms, and to train their aircrew.
You suggest that: "If our 'Nations' needs were put first (before the RAF’s aim to try and dominate everything aviation related) then perhaps the current excessive size of its RAF fighter/strike fleet could be reduced to help cover the cost of something that would make great sense for our 'Nations' benefit."
1) I'd suggest that our nation's needs should be put ahead of narrow RN interests, and that the RN should concentrate its efforts on its core activity of delivering effect by sea. The RN made its choice to retain the strategic deterrent. The country cannot afford for it to have carriers as well, and especially not since carriers represent an expensive, inefficient, niche capability - a nice to have rather than a must have.
2) With just 13 fast jet squadrons, I'd suggest to you that the RAF fleet is anything but excessive. It has been cut harder and further since the Cold War than any part of the RN's front line, despite being a more useful, more cost effective and more versatile means of projecting power.
You say: "It would probably have made good sense to give the Army these aircraft in the first place because they are basically mainly used to carry out Army/RM related work!" - and delivering fuel for Harriers in the field, and, and, and ..... Support helicopters are not, and should not be a pure Army asset, and in the UK's case, could not be. The AAC simply does not have the resources, infrastructure, or experience to operate larger support helicopters.
You say: "This nation lost a lot of excellent FAA pilots when the pro-RAF brigade and short sighted MoD effectively killed off the Sea Harrier too early." The RN struggled to man its two tiny frontline SHar squadrons, and, in the post Cold War world, the SHar was an expensive and rarely needed asset. In an ideal world I'd have kept it (and Jag too!) but this was a sensible cut.
You whine about having: "moved the FAA fixed-wing pilots away from their FAA base to an RAF base many miles away!" They joined a service, and presumably accepted that they would be posted wherever the exigencies of the service required. The tragedy of Joint Force Harrier was that the RN (who provided far less than 1/3 of the personnel) demanded and received half of the key posts, and two of the four squadrons, and then failed to deliver.
All this emotive bol.locks about "our once great Navy" tells me all I need to know about you, I'm afraid. Dry your eyes, Princess, and welcome to the 21st Century, where tough choices have to be made.