John
No apologies for the “lecture”, sometimes it’s necessary to have a refresher course on the facts. God knows, MoD don’t admit to them.
please say exactly what mods were incorporated after the accident to so successfully prevent a repetition over the past 15 years.
Why not ask the MoD? When the design of the Mk2 and its equipment came Under Ministry Control, the regulations state the aircraft technical publications (for both aircraft and equipment) MUST be up to date. (There is a very detailed checklist that must get all its boxes ticked, or it shouldn’t happen. Tech Pubs is just one item in 4 pages. Remarkably, the list concentrates on airworthiness components). In simple terms, and assuming MoD can demonstrate, as it is required to do, compliance with the above, you can ask the question two ways;
- Ask for a copy of all amendments to all Topic 2s since it came UMC.
- Ask for a copy of all HQ Mod Committee decisions.
To avoid wasting your time, I can tell you MoD won’t be able to answer properly. Firstly, the pubs were not up to date (as widely noted in Mull papers). Secondly, the same financial cuts stopped ATPs being routinely amended. Thirdly, you’ll be hard pressed to find someone who remembers HQMCs, never mind has the historical information (i.e. audit trail). But here’s a starter for ten - ask to see Directorate of Military Aircraft Projects (D/MAP) secretariat records. They should be at Wyton now.
For the hell of it, I’d ask a better series of questions.
- Following said financial cuts, how many Fault Investigation requests (MF760A) were refused?
- How many of these 760s would have resulted in a modification?
- How many were safety related?
- If/when funding re-instated, was retrospective action taken to assess rejected MF760s?
- Of those MF760s that did result in a modification, how many were not reflected in the respective ATPs, or did not result in drawing amendments, resulting in Maintainers not actually knowing what the build standard was meant to be?
I recall NARO pointing out one time that a common LRU, destined for Chinook, had over 60 DA modifications missing from its Topic 2. That's a hell of a quandry for the QA guy. The workshop knows of 60 missing mods in one box, but doesn't know what their classification is so can't make a judgement on which ones are crucial to its functionality, reliability, interchangeability or safety.
The importance of these questions is that the Aircraft Safety Case MUST reflect the current Design Authority Build Standard (not the in use standard, which usually lags). Can MoD demonstrate, as it is required to do, that this is the case? If not, how on earth can it demonstrate compliance with JSP553? It can't.
And just to be cheeky……. What action was taken against the staff who (a) permitted and encouraged these failures of mandated airworthiness process, and (b) raised concerns about it? Actually, I can answer that. (a) None. (b) Disciplinary action.