JP
If we assume, purely for the purposes of this discussion, that the a/c was not fit for purpose, then please say exactly what mods were incorporated after the accident to so successfully prevent a repetition over the past 15 years.
I’m afraid, John, you’re sounding suspiciously like one of the lackeys who drafts Ministerial replies whose sole aim is to compartmentalise the issues as a damage limitation exercise, but actually cause more harm by hiding the wider picture. MoD has consistently sought to retrospectively justify its (in)action PRIOR to the accident by referring the events AFTER it. As I quoted earlier;
“It has never happened before” is not valid evidence on its own, that a particular event will not happen”.
These rules require a proactive approach to safety management. Contrary to what MoD thinks acceptable, Safety Management should not be based on “Do nothing, let’s wait 15 years and see if we have an accident”. The Chinook is but one aircraft type whose airworthiness is supposed to be maintained under these rules. If you ask “What fatal crashes have, according to the Boards of Inquiry or Inquests, been caused by or contributed to by failure to implement mandated airworthiness regulations?”, then you get a truer picture – Nimrod, Sea King, Tornado/Patriot, Hercules…….. I’m not familiar with the recent Puma case, but I see MoD took a hammering again last week from the Wiltshire Coroner.
This kind of duplicity and inconsistency is becoming the norm from MoD. Its stance is ludicrous, and flies in the face of its own regulations. Hutton was like a rabbit in the headlights when interviewed by Mr Snow – possibly because he realised just what utter rubbish he had been advised to say, including the inference that serviceability and airworthiness are one and the same. His argument wouldn't last 10 seconds in court.
Similarly, the suggestion that modifications would prevent further accidents shows a very narrow understanding of MoD’s legal obligation under JSP553 Chapter 5 (maintaining airworthiness in-service) and the various procedural Defence Standards one follows to ensure compliance. Draw up a list of what contributes to airworthiness (it’s very long) and then ask if each has been carried out properly PRIOR to the accident. Then add another 4 or 5 columns for the other aircraft I mentioned. You’ll see a startling commonality emerge, which immediately elevates the matter beyond Chinook (or whatever aircraft), narrowing down the list of those responsible. One or two failures may not in themselves cause a problem, but the cumulative effect of multiple failures is there for all to see.
You may or may not agree with MoD’s view that “minor” transgressions such as not properly reporting faults are acceptable (noted in the BoI report). Again, MoD seeks to isolate and ignores what happened beforehand, or on other aircraft and equipment. If one minor fault wasn’t reported, that may be acceptable if the rest of the fault reporting, investigation and corrective action system was funded and functioning (which is one small component of maintaining airworthiness). But it wasn’t – a deliberate act to save money, which had the effect of contributing to the cumulative effect and increasing the probability of an event occurring. Instead of criticising the dead pilots for not reporting a fault (for example) why not expand the scope of the report by also saying “Even if they did report it, a Director and a Director General, in MoD(PE) and AMSO respectively, had 2 years earlier decided to slash funding and stop fault investigations”. Better still, just list the numerous audit reports which criticise MoD's failure in this respect and ask what action was taken. (MoD can't say, because it doesn't bother keeping such records, even though the reports' recommendations impact on their core business. How's that for contempt?). Then ask if the repeated failure to have faults investigated or corrective action taken in any way influenced air or ground crew actions, and caused a degree of laxity. (Human factors, another component of airworthiness). Yes, failure to report is wrong, but is the failure to ensure the aircraft was airworthy not a greater offence?
In which case, there would seem to be a prima facie case against those who knowingly compromised airworthiness across all fleets in the preceding years; and, even worse, those who have continued with this policy since knowing the damage it has caused. I deliberately say “policy” because they were advised of the risk and took a deliberate decision, when they had the option to comply with the regs.