I accept that the MoD Proc system requires 'reasoned explanation to be logged', but does that apply to BD as well?
In this context, the recommendations Boscombe make are always accompanied by a reasoned explanation, so “yes”. I’d say Boscombe are meticulous in this regard. If they didn’t provide reasoning, they wouldn’t be paid!
Do BD have to justify why any existing limitations are disregarded and their own put in place, or is the statement 'we havent looked at it so it must be unsafe' all that is needed? In my experience no credit seems to be given to previous work or certification already granted to other operators of the aircraft, it smacks a bit of arrogance in that only BD's view is taken as valid.
I’m sure I’ll be corrected if I’m wrong, but the whole point on Mk3 is the configuration is unique to MoD UK. The Aircraft Safety Case has to be constructed against that build standard and intended use. What is safe in one build standard/use may be unsafe in another so, for example, existing limitations (say, on the Mk2) would not just be accepted on the Mk3, but would have to be assessed against the new build standard and use. It is not for BD to justify this, but MoD, and is a much abused area of airworthiness certification. In this case it would appear Boscombe’s adverse comments were confined to what could not be validated or verified, in accordance with the standards imposed on them (Boscombe) - the “new” hybrid nature of the aircraft equipment, particularly its software.
Of course Boeing’s input is crucial, which is why I wonder at the relationship between them, MoD and Boscombe. This whole saga smacks of Boscombe having warned MoD of the dangers of the hybrid design procurement strategy, but were ignored. If I recall, the contract was originally all Mk2s, with the split to Mk2 and Mk3 made later. That is a big change. Originally, the programme resources would have been geared to a “follow on buy” of a known build standard. To suddenly include a new Mk of aircraft requires a complete reappraisal of procurement strategy and funding. My gut feeling is they ran into financial trouble immediately, “forcing” the hybrid solution – but in fact it would have been wiser to pay more for a build standard that Boeing recognised and carried less risk. In short, this was “novel and contentious”, the criteria for elevation to 2 Star and above to benefit from their “wisdom”. And so to the Audit report which trashed that very senior management for “lack of management oversight”. Notably it didn’t name anyone, but we all know………
Jacko’s post gets back to what we were saying – a certain nervousness existed in MoD post-Mull because, very clearly, the Mk2 should never have been released to service. Boscombe were probably frustrated at MoD’s bizarre inconsistency. Ignored on Mk2 in 1994, similarly ignored in the following years on other programmes (leading to the 2 Star ruling I mentioned, which was specifically sought to establish just what rules we were working to - those laid down or those made up on a whim) yet at the same time suddenly listened to on Mk3 and MAR withheld at the first sign of concern. What this highlights is how compartmentalised MoD is at a certain level. Indeed, MoD encourages this and in doing so fails to learn lessons from other programmes which were recognising and avoiding the same risks on a daily basis.