Lurking 123
May I refer you to the following paragraphs of the BOI as submitted to the AOC:
para 16e
"The weather was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre."
para 32c
"In the forecast conditions, the icing clearance would have allowed an IMC pull-up from low level flight to Safety Altitude over the Mull of Kintyre."
para 45b
The BOI concluded "that the Rad Alt setting procedures used by the crew were a contributory factor in the accident."
para 51
"During this phase of the flight, to continue flying visually, the crew would have needed to adjust the aitcraft's height and airspeed to the prevailing cloudbase and visibility. The Board assessed that the possibility of the crew visually acquiring the lighthouse was remote, given the fact that it was in fog at the time. The hillside from lighthouse elevation to summit was also in cloud, although there were irregular areas of improved visibility up to 500m. The general weather close to the Mull was also very poor, with broken cloud at 200ft and 500m visibility below. Furthermore, any visual contact with the Mull or Lighthouse should have prompted a reduction in height and speed well below those found at impact."
para 54
"If the crew did not have visual contact with the Mull, and had decided not to attempt a landfall in the vicinity of the lighthouse, they would in the opinion of the Board, have been faced with 2 options: to turn away from land and attempt to route VFR towards Corran, parallel to their intended track but over the sea to the west of the mull of Kintyre peninsula, until clear of the poor weather; or to climb on track, accepting a change of flight conditions to IMC if necessary." (See extract from para 32c).
para 56
"The Board considered why the crew had not been alerted to their proximity to the ground, by either visual sighting or radar altimeter information, at any time from coasting - in until the initiation of the flare prior to impact. The lack of visual warning appears to indicate that the crew had lost all visual references and werein IMC during this phase of the flight. ----- The positioning of the Rad Alt bugs would have limited the crew to either a visual or a visual and audio warning at 69ft, depending on selection of the audio selector switch which could not be determined. This warning would have been too late, in the circumstances, to prevent impact with the ground."