Low Level Navex
Walter,
I am not sure I have enough time left on this planet to respond to all the points you make in your post of 3 December, but we have met and talked several times, and you are well aware that I am not trying to give an opinion on the cause of this accident - I have always stated that I do not make any claims to know this, and that the facts (real not hypotheses) that I quote may or may not not have anything to do with the accident - but they do cast doubt on the justice of a finding of gross negligence. However, you do castigate me for my comment that this was not a low level NAVEX - perhaps, since like you I was not a pilot in the RAF (although I was lucky enough to do a couple of hundred hours flying during engineer cadet training), I have the wrong terminology, but to me a NAVEX is different from a properly planned VFR flight - I would be happy to be corrected. We do know it was a planned VFR flight because this is what the BOI, who did talk to witnesses contrary to your comments, said about it:
30. Operational Procedures. The Board considered that the tasking information was made available to the detachment in sufficient time and detail to enable the crew to properly plan for the flight. Although the maps used by the crew were not recovered, the Board determined that the sortie to Inverness was thoroughly planned, by both pilots and crewmen, as a low level VFR flight. The crew obtained suitable weather information for the flight, and they arranged for the passengers to be issued with appropriate safety equipment and given a comprehensive pre-flight safety briefing. The crew had access to adequate NOTAM information and arranged for their intended flight in the UK Low Flying System to be properly notified. The flight was self authorised by Flt Lt TAPPER, who indicated on the F1575B that he would occupy the left hand cockpit seat. The Board considered that there were only 3 areas of particular note:
a. Outbriefing Procedures. The RAF Aldergrove Flying Order Book (FOB) and the No 230 Sqn Standing Orders (SSO) required Chinook captains to self authorise and to outbrief the 230 Sqn Duty Authorising Officer (DAO) prior to flight. The orders regarding outbriefs, contained in the 2 documents, differ slightly; the RAF Aldergrove FOB implies that aircraft captains are always to carry out an outbrief, but the 230 Sqn SSO implies that an outbrief is not required outside normal working hours. The HQNI Flying Order Book states that the 230 Sqn DAO was to ensure that Chinook captains outbrief through him before departure. On this occasion the DAO was involved with a 230 Sqn Puma formation brief and was unavailable. Flt Lt TAPPER self-authorised and left photocopies of a map showing his intended route with the SHFNI Ops Clerk. The Board considered that in leaving the copy of his route with the Ops Clerk, Flt Lt TAPPER had attempted to comply with the requirement to conduct an outbrief with the DAO. Although it is likely that the weather situation would have been discussed at a face to face outbrief, the Board considered it unlikely that this brief would have involved a detailed analysis of the crew's intentions. The DAO was not the authorising officer for the flight and the normal outbrief for the Chinook crew consisted of a brief outline of the task, and a statement that a crew brief had taken place in accordance with SOPs. The Board concluded that it is most unlikely that a face to face outbrief would have changed the crew's intentions or actions, and that this non-compliance with procedures was not a factor in the accident.
b. This was a comment on crew duty time - and confirmed that they were totally legal at the time of the accident although it was not clear what the crew planned to do from Inverness onwards.
c. Flight Planning Considerations. The Chinook HC2 icing clearance precluded flight in icing conditions in indicated temperatures colder than +4 degrees C. When planning the task to Inverness during the evening of 1 Jun, Flt Lt TAPPER decided, because of the forecast weather, the en-route terrain elevations, the available diversions and the limitations of the Chinook HC2 icing clearance, that it would be unwise to attempt an IFR transit. He planned instead for a low level VFR flight, and included calculations of the Safety Altitudes for each leg of the sortie in his plan. Following his pre-flight preparation for the NI tasking, on the morning of 2 Jun, it remained Flt Lt TAPPER's intention to fly the subsequent sortie to Inverness in VMC. The Board considered that there are indications in the accounts of the people with whom Flt Lt TAPPER spoke prior to his departure to Inverness, that he had mentally ruled out the option of flying under IFR. However, it is unclear whether he had dismissed the idea of IMC penetration completely, or just the option of flying the route to Inverness under IFR. Following their return from the NI tasking, and prior to their departure for Inverness the crew updated their weather information by fax. The Board determined from this information that, in the forecast conditions, the Chinook HC2 icing clearance would most likely have precluded flight in IMC above safety altitude over the Highlands of Scotland, and that Flt Lt TAPPER's decision not to plan to fly to Inverness under IFR was correct. Nevertheless, in the forecast conditions, the icing clearance would have allowed an IMC pull-up from low level flight to Safety Altitude over the Mull of Kintyre, and an IFR transit to Prestwick or Glasgow. There was no evidence to indicate that Flt Lt TAPPER was unaware of his option to legally penetrate IMC in the weather conditions in the area of the Mull of Kintyre at the time of the accident. Nevertheless, the Board considered that if Flt Lt TAPPER had mentally dismissed the possibility of flight in IMC, it may have reduced his willingness, if only for a brief period, to convert from VFR to IFR flight on encountering bad weather during the approach to the Mull of Kintyre. The Board concluded that this could have been a contributory factor in the accident.
The "no-one will ever know" comment was certainly not a "directive" from on high - it is a plain and very obvious statement of fact - indeed one of very few facts most people including the Air Marshals can agree on - your ideas are just as much hypotheses as those of the Reviewing Officers. If you think you have facts to support them then, as others have said before me, please provide them - interesting as they are, and plausible as they may be to you and possibly others, your suggestions as to what the crew intended to do have not been supported by a single verifiable fact that I am aware of, and I have even tried to help you find such collateral information - as you are aware.
JB