Originally Posted by PJ2
Well, I didn't "fail" to mention it mainly because it wasn't then and isn't now a problem endemic to Airbus and non-moving throttles - the very same thing, leaving a throttle open, has happened on Boeing aircraft.
So, would you direct me to such a report from a non FBW airbus ?
Remember, the case involves the next 3 repetitive facts :
- One deactivated thrust reverser
- Same thrust / throttle lever left in an open position during landing
- Overrun the runway, with catastrophic consequences for 2 out of 3
I do share your view that Airbus A/THR understanding and proficiency knowledge acquisition
requires regular training. But as
aquadalte mentioned, why such specific training has to become mandatory ?
Auto throttle doesn’t need much thinking thanks to its simplicity of operation, Airbus A/THR requires thinking + training …
How is it any better ?
Manual operation of the Bus thrust levers is not a problem, it’s even a pleasure.
The transition between manual and automatic operation (and vice versa) lacks of simple simplicity … that’s where relies the culprit for "momentary confusion" as you call it yourself.
PJ2, (DC9, DC8, B727, L1011, B767, A320/319, A340/330 endorsed, past Airbus instructor, fully involved in flight safety and data work).
My next question is directed to a very experienced man obviously (and a good pilot also as you made it to your retirement !) but more particularly to someone who takes safety very seriously :
A simple modification of the RETARD auto call out could be implemented to make sure that the call out does not stop before ALL thrust levers are effectively retarded, which
could help other crews not to inadvertently forget one of those thrust levers in the inappropriate CLB detent during landing.
Such a simple modification
could help to prevent another Congonhas.
Why should we do without ?
What I, (and many, I suspect) am presently finding far more disconcerting is stories of avionics/software issues including spike detection and voting. Those are issues which may possibly be beyond a crew's ability to assess and successfully counter and this again isnt' only an Airbus issue.
For the spike detection and voting, I agree, but when the "protection" kicks in for no reason and overrides the pilot inputs, and sends the pax and crew in the roof, to this day, that is only an Airbus issue.