CONF iture;
Sir, you are absolutely correct … but only as you fail to mention that Congonhas was already the third accident of the type. A trend developed already but 99% of the pilots around the world, including myself, and probably that implicated TAM crew, were kept ignorant of that once believed unconceivable mishap and its possible dire consequences … but Airbus knew and deliberately opted to ignore the very simple safety recommendation made after the second accident.
Well, I didn't "fail" to mention it mainly because it wasn't then and isn't now a problem endemic to Airbus and non-moving throttles - the very same thing, leaving a throttle open, has happened on Boeing aircraft.
Thrust levers/throttles on airplanes are, without exception, simple, mainly because they can be a single-point of failure if mis-handled. Push them forward, more power, pull them all the way back, power to idle. Airbus is absolutely no different than any other airplane.
Perhaps it is a momentary helmet fire or perhaps it is a lack of understanding of the a/thr system through lack of training, practise or momentary confusion.
This isn't an Airbus problem - it is a training/SOP matter. Second-guessing what is perceived as a "complex or different" system is not the pilots' perview or job - never has been. Millions and millions of hours have been flown on Airbus 320/340 series airplanes without a hitch. Same with Boeing. Non-moving thrust levers are not an issue for almost all crews but there will always be crews on both types which will have "issues". For me, the 767 throttles "hunting for speed" on approach drove me up a wall and I always disconnected them to stabilize the "wolf-and-rabbit" population phenomena of throttles chasing speed and vice-versa. When teaching on the 320, I always got my students to practise disconnecting and re-connecting the a/thr system so they had confidence in it and their ability to do so and understand.
What I, (and many, I suspect) am presently finding far more disconcerting is stories of avionics/software issues including spike detection and voting. Those are issues which may possibly be beyond a crew's ability to assess and successfully counter and this again isnt' only an Airbus issue.
PJ2