J B
I, too, have not been saying much lately but not for reasons of waiting on the establishment but I feel obliged to challenge some points made in you recent post.
<<If indeed you were to "banjo" your aircraft into the hillside "whilst doing a low level Navex in marginal weather conditions" (a situation that did not apply to this flight anyway) ...>>
Well, many parameters point that way why are you so certain? Has anyone come forward as a witness to the preflight briefing? Have you had a privileged look at the hitherto absent flight plan?
<< ... having failed, for reasons beyond your control, to make the planned turn as selected for the next waypoint,...>>
As I have pointed out in detail on several occassions, they had already come in very close when they made the change in waypoint which presumably implied that they were under control at that point see the map I posted some time ago. Furthermore, despite the misleading track presented at one of the inquiries by the RAF showing a straight track through a misplaced position of waypoint change to the impact area they had actually turned right at that change and held that track and there is reason to believe that track was planned.
<<...you were struggling to get over the hill you knew was in front of you with an uncommanded engine run-up...>>
That's out because the engines were found at an intermediate power level and MATCHED strongly suggesting a steady state that neither the pilots nor the FADEC had had time to disturb with the full collective pulled up in the last second manouevre. Boeing's analysis had it that they had slowed down (in air speed) in the last leg which would have required less power than the preceding cruise level and therefore further negates the probability of an uncontrolled run up.
I have argued before that they had no intentions of going over the hill as they seemed to be going for the LZ at waypoint A and had altimeters set for landing at that height which is why I suggest they were slowing down.
<<... or a jammed control crate ...>>
That could only have happened when they were already too close as per argument above and they seemed to hold the track OK of 035 from waypoint change to the last seconds when the a/c appeared to respond as expected to the emergency actions evidenced by the control positions you remember, 035 was set on the handling pilot's HSI. Just what part of this leg shows any evidence of jammed controls? Let's look at collective alone by way of example:
The rotors RPMs at impact tells us a lot:
they were down about 10% from memory;
the collective was fully up and they had gained some height in those last seconds so the rotor pitch had responded;
if you check with Boeing's specs, the rotors could loose a significant bit more RPM and still function that is, there was still some significant lift to be had in an immediate emergency lift or (air) braking effort regardless of what the turbines were doing;
they very nearly cleared that cliff and were starting a full slew that is a good way of slowing a twin rotor without loosing height a bit more time and they may have landed in a heap but at a significantly reduced speed;
that they did not cause the rotor RPM to have reduced further before impact suggests not that there was a control problem but rather that they were surprised at their proximity to the ground.
<<...Actually, more likely you entire thoughts would be devoted to trying to get out of an impossible situation!>>
I agree that it was an impossible situation that they were in at the end but for different reasons than yours:
Now I could well be wrong with the following description of the power situation but I think that you in a much better position to know should think about this just to get the ball rolling is my tuppence worth that hopefully you will constructively correct as required:
Starting with Boeing's condition that, after the right turn, they had started to slow down (in air speed, but they had gotten very close to the Mull by that time and the very much increased local wind speed had resulted in the ground speed remaining unchanged);
straight and level but slowing down when still at high speed in a helo is a minimum power sitiuation (thrust just balances the weight drag does the slowing) and further, there is a tendency for the rotors to speed up as the drag decreases on the leading etc etc such that the FADEC (as fitted in this case) would be reducing the fuel to maintain (ie limit to) 100% rotor RPM (you lot could explain this better than me) this may introduce a slight further delay in FADEC response and/or turbine lag when emergency power is demanded/collective pulled up;
in this condition, you must remember that the thrust = the weight and that any sudden turns, for example, before the turbines can spool up, would result in a loss of height without using the stored energy of the rotors by way of increased collective;
so if you were intending to land just before steeply rising ground (with no option for an overshoot) and for whatever reason misjudged your distance to go, you would be flying into a vertical corner.
So what could you do if you had got too close before slowing down enough?:
if you suddenly realise that you are approaching steeply rising ground in this power situation, a steeply banked turn is out because you don't want to loose height, you would use your rotor energy best by gaining height whilst slewing sideways (thrust still vertical) to wash of speed (takes no energy to slew in a Chinook) and this is what they had started to do.
Yet one S.O.A.B said at one of the inquiries that this was not a recognised manouevre for a Chinook yet you see it at air shows all the time and it is described in American docs and yet further, not one of you venerable aviators challenged that S.O.A.B.
<<As to the true cause of this accident it is a fact that "no-one will ever know" - a position acknowledged by the House of Lords Select Committee >>
What does this mean? - a directive from those on high? - how can this be a fact?
IMHO there is a good deal more that can be established about the circumstances if you regulars could drop that mantra for a while.
Now to other posters:
While you all seem to like blasting Mssrs Wratten & Day, you are not appreciating the position that they may have been in: at the time; any open findings that allowed any possibility of foul play had to be dismissed a.s.a.p. or there may have been significant public unrest and perhaps disquiet within the police/security forces involved in NI in the absence of anything positive to prove an accident/equipment failure, what else could they have done if directed by the politicians to contain speculation? - the verdict implied absolutely no doubt whatsoever did it not? Nothing less would have done it. They would surely have accepted that it was their duty to do this for the greater good.
A (difficult and distasteful) job well done and probably amply rewarded but they have to live with themselves which may be very hard if it were to eventually emerge that the crew had been involved in an extra activity which may or may not have left them exposed to an error by a third party whether accidental or wilful and their action had delayed investigation for so many years.
My point here is that it is of no use targetting those two AVMs look at the bigger picture.
One aspect that is not in doubt is that this crash took the teeth out of the anti-terrorism effort leaving the concilliatory path the only option the ceasefire followed so very soon afterwards the secret negotiations had triumphed Clinton had a feather in his cap Westminster could wash its hands of its most difficult obligations to the people of those provinces.
But it is important to look at Ireland and realise that the end did not justify the means the peace process has proved lousy for all sides.
Looking back, is it enough to just clear the pilots' names based upon the AVMs not satisfying the legal niceties? - or is it in the peoples best interest to get as full a picture as possible of what actually happened just in case this dreadful event was not just a convenient, fortuitous break for the politicians?