There are similarities with the A330 QF72 flight incident
QF72 incident may lead to the grounding of Airbus A330-300 models - Airbus
only if it is confirmed if the adirus are of the effected P/N type and subsequent AD applicability. http://rgl.faa.gov/REGULATORY_AND_GU...2008-17-12.pdf
The mistake it seems they made in QF72 was not to switch off the IR 1 and corresponding ADR 1 when NAV IR 1 was annuciated on the ECAM. This still caused pitching down on 2 occasions of the a/c with the autopilot disengaged under manual control due to the incorrect flight data values sensed by one of the adirus translated to the fcc - which remains in ultimate control. See emergency operational AD http://www.casa.gov.au/airworth/airw...0/A330-095.pdf
http://rgl.faa.gov/REGULATORY_AND_GU...2008-17-12.pdf
SUMMARY:
The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to
certain Airbus Model A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes equipped with certain Litton air data inertial reference units (ADIRUs). That AD currently requires modifying the shelf (floor panel) above ADIRU 3, modifying the polycarbonate guard that covers the ADIRUs for certain airplanes and modifying the ladder located in the avionics compartment for certain airplanes. This new AD requires those modifications on additional airplanes.
This new AD also requires replacing all three ADIRUs with improved ADIRUs. This new AD also adds Model A318 series airplanes to the
applicability. This AD results from reports that ''NAV IR FAULT'' messages have occurred during takeoff due to failure of an ADIRU and subsequent analysis showing that the shelf modification has not sufficiently addressed failure of an ADIRU.
We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of an ADIRU during flight, which could result in loss of one source of critical attitude and airspeed data and reduce the ability of the flightcrew to control the airplane.