Clandestino, I would not pretend Airbus A/THR concept is "less safe" but less straight forward, certainly.
These thrust levers could remain in a frozen position 99% of the air time and still assure all the necessary thrust changes … no wonder time to time, under stress, a crew forget about them …
A/THR disconnection takes some additional thinking … why should it be that way ?
Full thrust can be produced with both thrust levers still in the unrelated idle detent …
I think Airbus forgot to keep it simple.
However I do agree that FWC that shouts "RETARD!" untill all the levers are near idle would most likely prevent the accident but pulling all the throttles back for landing must have seemed so natural to AB designers that they never considered the scenario that was played at Congohas.
I am not aware of the logic in terms of frequency, repetition, volume change, behind the RETARD auto call-outs, but in
this manual thrust landing the reminder never gave up.
Well, CONF iture an automatic TCAS, or any other device taking control of the aircraft, against previous consent of the pilots, seems dangerous and a huge step against pilot full authority on bord...
I know, I know,
aguadalte …
but !?