Well, CONF iture an automatic TCAS, or any other device taking control of the aircraft, against previous consent of the pilots, seems dangerous and a huge step against pilot full authority on bord...
Clandestino,
Can you please elaborate on that Qantas Bangkok situation, as I recall it has nothing to do with the Auto-Throttle/Auto-Thrust concept. (And yes, I think 747's are Auto-throttled, not Auto-Thrusted).
Here's a summary of the accident, taken from a quick look on the internet and I call your attention on what is writen in bold letters (my bold):
It can be viewed in its entirety at http://www.basi.gov.au/acci/ojh/vh-ojh.pdf. A preliminary ATSB report of the accident cited the company's Oct. 1977 policy to use flaps 25 (as opposed to flaps 30) and idle reverse thrust under normal conditions. This policy obtained maximum life of the carbon brakes on the B747-400 and reduced costs associated with maintenance as well as noise levy charges (see ASW, Jan. 3, 2000). The Accident Flight
Had the crew used reverse thrust, they probably would have been able to bring the airplane to a safe stop. However, other aspects of cockpit procedures raise substantive issues of crew coordination. When the aircraft was about 3 meters (10 ft.) above the runway and floating farther down than the ideal touchdown point, the captain, who was the pilot not flying, advised the first officer to execute a go-around. The first officer pushed the thrust levers forward just as the main landing gear wheels touched the tarmac. The captain immediately cancelled the go-around, not by saying so, but by retarding the thrust levers. As the ATSB report said, "Those events resulted in confusion amongst the other pilots (first and second officer) and contributed to the crew not selecting (or noticing the absence of) reverse thrust during the landing roll."
According to the ATSB report, the jumbo jet actually accelerated for about a 1,000 ft. after touchdown (due to residual thrust) before beginning a slow decrease in speed, but not enough to avoid hurtling off the far end of the runway. Having decided to not get airborne, the crew was waterborne, aquaplaning down the rain-slicked runway.
The ATSB report is structured in such a way that it provides a brief description in each subject area, with an itemization of significant failures and significant inadequacies in defenses. The very brevity of this approach gives a hard edge and an attention-getting potency to its findings.
Regarding cockpit procedures, the ATSB said:
"During the examination of the performance of the aircraft on the runway, it became evident that the flaps 25/idle reverse thrust landing procedure used by the crew (and which was the 'preferred' company procedure) was not appropriate for operations on water-affected runways. The appropriate approach/landing procedure was flaps 30/full reverse thrust. This had the characteristics of a lower approach speed, of being easier to fly in terms of speed control and runway aim point (for most company pilots), and of providing maximum aerodynamic drag after touchdown when the effectiveness of the wheel brakes could be reduced because of aquaplaning. Had this configuration been used, the overrun would most probably have been avoided.
(quoted from an article on BNET)
Clandestino, You may not agree with my point of view but, your argumentation has missed the whole point.
When I asked if the Congonhas accident may have happened with an auto-throttled aircraft I meant that, when retarding only one of the throttles the other(s) tend to follow. In order to retard only one of the throttles you would have to disengage the Auto-Throttle and this means a positive and intentional action. In the Congonhas case, they commited a mistake, and were completely overriden by the system. The only thing in common in both cases was poor judgement.
V.